

## **OUTLINE FOR THE MAIN REPORT**

*— Fourth Revised Draft —*

The IPSP Report gathers the state-of-the-art knowledge about the desirability and possibility of all relevant forms of structural social change. It synthesizes the knowledge on the principles, possibilities, and methods for improving the main institutions of the modern societies.

The IPSP Report seeks consensus whenever possible but does not hide controversies and honestly presents up-to-date arguments and analyses, and debates about them.

The IPSP Report does not cover all social issues and all social policies, but focuses on the most important issues involving substantial changes and bearing on the long run perspective.

The IPSP Report draws on the competence of a few hundred academics (of all relevant disciplines, perspectives, and regions of the world) willing and able to engage in a true interdisciplinary dialogue on key dimensions of social progress.

The IPSP Report, to be completed in 2017, will be addressed to all social actors, movements, organizations, politicians and decision-makers, in order to provide them with the best expertise on questions that bear on social change.

## **BASIC GUIDELINES**

### **COMMON QUESTIONS FOR EACH CHAPTER**

- where do we stand and what are the trends ?
- what do principles of justice suggest?
- major obstacles and opportunities

### **COMMON APPROACH FOR EACH CHAPTER**

- identify consensus and debates/disagreements among experts
- present scientific advances and identify research gaps
- compare/relate academic knowledge and public opinion

### **CROSS-CUTTING TOPICS THROUGHOUT THE REPORT**

Four cross-cutting topics are not be treated in separate chapters, but are referred to throughout the report.

- **science, technology and innovation:** how the research and innovation process interacts with social processes (a special team will work on weaving this topic throughout the report);
- **globalization:** it impacts all aspects of societies, creates opportunities and threatens established norms and situations;
- **social movements:** social progress is not mainly the work of official authorities, and a great variety of actors of social transformation are considered both for the analysis of trends and the examination of possible changes guided by justice principles;
- **health:** health appears in several chapters as it matters for inequalities, governance, and public policy.
- **gender:** gender issues appear in many chapters, if not all.

## **DETAILED TABLE OF CONTENTS**

### **INTRODUCTORY CHAPTERS**

## **Chapter 1 - Social trends and new geographies**

### **Narrative:**

a) There is a huge gap between the enormous potential of resources, knowledge, and capacity and the reality of increasing inequality and exclusion. b) The achievements of the post-WWII decades (decolonization and the developmental state, welfare state and labor rights) are being threatened. c) A new global situation with a new social and spatial configuration has emerged, characterized by contradictions with possibilities as well as dangers.

### **Structure of the chapter:**

#### *The New Global Constellation*

### **1.1 At the peak of possibilities**

Over the past few decades – say, since the 1960s - social life on earth has been transformed in an unprecedented way. Population growth, technological innovation, growth of material production, growth of income, revolution in communications, are some of the aspects to recall here. World income increased by 5.3 times or 530 per cent during the three decades between 1980 and 2010. [That is to say, while the world income was estimated at US\$11.88 trillion in 1980, it was \$63.06 trillion in 2010. In per capita terms the increase has been 3.4 times, from \$2679 to \$9178.] One could perhaps say, that we are in the midst of a second great transformation.

The awareness of the importance of human rights has grown, as has the notion of citizenship as a foundation for democratic decision making.

In parallel, the awareness of women's rights has increased enormously. The introduction of "the pill" in 1960 in the US and a few years later in other countries, has contributed to this – as has the rise of women's movements across the globe, and the improvement of education for women. (Of course, there are conservative countermovements, and we should not forget that two-thirds of all women still cannot read, and that violence against women is still endemic.)

Technology has become a major site for realizing economic growth and social progress. This had led to massive investment in a range of specific technological options, for example in the spread of computers and new communication technologies, car based transport, electricity, and fossil fuel technologies, medical and pharmaceutical discoveries and inventions.

In a (still relative small) part of the world welfare states have emerged with extensive social-security arrangements.

In short, humanity has unprecedented resources at its disposal to deal with many of the persisting problems such as poverty, hunger, inequalities, environmental degradation, ... Yet, these resources, though available, are not employed to effectively create social progress. In many contexts and circumstances, we experience regression, or at least an ambivalent relation between progress in some respects and regression in other respects.

While awareness of environmental problems has grown, the realization that we dramatically need to adopt collective solutions to reshape the interaction between humans and nature has lagged behind.

While economic inequality between countries has decreased, inequality of income and wealth has significantly increased within countries.

A large chunk of the world's 'real' economy is spent on arms and armies which not only consume resources that could be used to promote growth, but actually contribute to inflict direct social costs.

While investment in technology has been huge, it has also contributed massively to inequality, pollution and climate change. Innovation has been focused on the rich ignoring the problems of the poor, and far too resource and fossil fuel intensive. Innovation is embedded in a specific techno-economic paradigm which will not be able to deal with the challenge of sustainable development, and hence needs redirection. The current institutional structure in which technology development is embedded does not encourage broader participation and inclusive and sustainable innovation

Education: While Illiteracy may not be the most important problem now, the absence of a minimum of education is a serious issue. Consider the proportion of people without at least a secondary level of education. It is a huge deficit in most developing countries. Very few adults have crossed the 50 per cent mark in countries with Medium and Low Human Development accounting for close to half the world population of 7.1 billion. In many poor countries only a small fraction has attained this rather modest threshold in an age of digital communication, information sharing and knowledge production. It is possible to argue that the digital divide is creating a new form of illiteracy.

Health: A similar picture would emerge if the question of basic health conditions is to be flagged. There are several indicators, but the robust one of Infant Mortality Rate would indicate the state of affairs in most developing countries. While the High Human Development countries report an average IMR of 5, the figure for Low Human Development countries is 13 times higher or 64.

Equally important is access to housing and related amenities such as drinking water, electricity for domestic use, and adequate sewage disposal. Whatever indicator one may pick for a dignified existence, the road to cover would seem to be quite long and hard. While medical advances have made dramatic progresses in preserving life, in many parts of the world death causes are tied to extremely precarious life conditions.

Open disputes based upon religion and ethnicity have led in many parts of the world to dramatic social dislocations. Gender as well as cultural diversities have also been the target of oppression in many contexts. The optimistic anticipation that universalism and tolerance would win has faded to give way to open violence, massacres and forced migration in so many places.

## **1.2 Recent social transformations**

The process of globalization (deterritorialization) which manifests itself with new energy after its earlier appearance in the years 1870-1914, leads to a compression of space and time. Growth of supranational economic entities (EU, NAFTA, Mercosur, ALBA, ASEAN, WTO, etc.). Relative loss of power and sovereignty for separate states; increasing need of supranational authorities regulating economic and social relations. Rise of transnational NGOs (Amnesty International, Global Justice, and so many others), and of altermondialisation movements. At the same time, initiatives at the local level gain more visibility with the now available resources to communicate and directly link to transnational networks creating opportunities for the establishment of multiple identities and diverse focuses of solidarity.

In recent decades a major industrialization process has taken place outside the traditional OECD-countries. This has not led to decreasing inequalities of income and property (Piketty, etc.) within countries, though poverty is often decreasing. We seem to see however a split of what used to be called the “Third World” between the winners of neoliberal globalization (especially in East and South Asia, but also in parts of South America, esp. Brazil), and the losers in parts of Africa and elsewhere.

Inequality has been the hall mark of neoliberal economic policies that have got well entrenched since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the signing of the World Trade Agreement, and creation of the WTO. Financialization has weakened the real sectors of the economy, fiscal austerity leading to a halt in the expansion of the state’s role in economic development especially in poor developing countries, many of which had just started to make some progress in overall economic development leading to some increase in the standard of living of the people.

Within countries increasing inequality manifested across economic and/or social groups has also been a product of neoliberal economic policies given the existence of a power

elite, concentration of wealth and income, increasing concentration of new knowledge in such emerging areas as ICT and higher education. Many countries witnessed large scale public protests and mobilizations against the ill effects of inequality. How to articulate the social consequences of inequality in a way that would lead to a rethinking of the policies hitherto followed in so many countries?

Several additional dimensions of inequality have to be highlighted in terms of social trends with a view to develop a coherent approach to its articulation and development of alternative solutions.

- In most developing countries the rural-urban divide has become sharper despite the continuing high share of rural population.
- Gender inequality has been a central theme in many global reports and studies. New and emerging inequality has to do with the development of such technologies as ICT as well as other areas of science.
- A knowledge and technological divide as between the developed and developing countries, as well across the developed and developing world is another global phenomenon that has added a new dimension to global inequality, despite the ability of a few emerging countries to close the gap to a very limited extent. In fact, the danger of a large number of poor countries and poor people across the globe falling outside and get stuck at the bottom of this knowledge gap is a reality. The initial structural backwardness and within-country inequality is an important factor in this emerging reality.
- Taking both developed and developing countries, the most entrenched form of inequality of all kinds is inequality based on social identity. That is to say, categorical or ‘durable inequality’ (à la Charles Tilly) as opposed to incremental inequality, both at the global as well as national levels, fosters sharp material and symbolic frontiers across identity markers such as caste, race, religion, and similar social group-based differences. It is so well entrenched that no coherent response to it has yet been undertaken from a global point of view. It takes the form of a pretense natural social hierarchy in a country like India where people are ranked according to fixed markers without any chance to transpose hierarchical barriers. Thus certain social groups or communities (e.g. the former untouchable community and the tribal community) find themselves at the bottom of the social ladder. Examples include African Americans and Hispanics in the United States, and people of African origin in South Africa. In some other places it is the religious minorities and migrants who are relegated to the lowest ranks.

Social progress is impeded by stigmatization, discrimination, prejudice, oppression, exclusion and a variety of similar practices resulting in the marginalization of certain socially identifiable groups. This constitutes perhaps one of the social roots of many problems the world is witnessing both within and across countries resulting in internal

and external conflicts. In this age of globalization, an unskilled worker with low education is at a distinct disadvantage and hence would end up at the lower end of the inequality scale. But an unskilled, low educated from a rural area has a greater chance of finding himself at a further lower end. If such a person happens to be a woman, then there is an even greater chance of occupying a still further end of the inequality scale. But the bottom is likely to be occupied if such a person i.e. woman, also belongs to a socially disadvantaged group distinguished by race, colour, caste or religious identity.

### **1.3 New spatial configurations**

The “Global North” has begun to lose its dominant position, and in some cases and respects transformations in other parts of the world deviated significantly from those in “the North”: rise of “emerging economies”, often through state-led development -- thus distancing to some extent from the neoliberal model that informs market and state patterns of interaction in recent decades. Achievements in terms of decreasing inequality, reducing poverty and growth of “middle classes” in some parts of the world compared to increasing inequality and decline of the middle classes in the North. This new and more diversified spatial configuration entails that social progress is no longer conceivable in conceptually straightforward and historically linear-evolutionary terms. Rather, ambivalences – or paradoxes – as well as regress in the pursuit of social progress come more clearly to the fore.

There are enormous differences between groups of countries. Some catching up between developing and developed countries seems to have taken place but the gap is still quite large. Despite some catching up, the per capita income in most regions in the developing world has declined as a percentage of that in the developed countries. East and South East Asia are the only exceptions here. The collapse of the erstwhile Soviet Union and East European socialist states witnessed a fall down of income followed by some recovery such that their per capita income as a share of that in developed countries is half the figures for 1980 (17.7 in 2010 as against 36.0 in 1980). Developing countries, with the biggest deficits in basic capabilities and infrastructure facilities saw an impressive overall growth of their income by 8 times between 1980 and 2010. However, only a few countries have managed to reduce, marginally though, the income gap between the developed and developing countries. While there is much attention given to some of the fast growing countries, often referred to as emerging economies, their ability to bridge the income gap with the capitalist West has been rather limited such that substantial economic power and resources continue to be concentrated in a few countries accounting for less than one fifth of the world population.

Against this background it stands to reason that more and more people try to improve their lot by moving elsewhere. In the last decades the percentage of immigrants in the rich countries has increased, while immigration in the poor countries seems to have decreased. [Just one of the many phenomena resulting from the interaction of new technologies and traditional perspectives is the growing gender imbalance, that is already leading to large-scale processes of marriage migration.]

### *Conundrums and Tensions*

## **1.4 Democracy and capitalism**

Parliamentary democracy is not doing well. In the North, political parties are losing members, floating voters have become a dominant phenomenon, and the credibility of 'democratic' institutions has been decreasing. In parts of "the South" high-intensity democratic participation compared to "citizen disaffection" in "the North" seem to counteract this trend. At the same time, xenophobic and racist forces seem to gain strength on a world-scale. There are new possibilities for mass-democratic decision making through the internet and the 'new media', but this emergence of an information society (as Castells called it back in the 90s) is a precarious affair. Will it be controlled by big capital in post-industrial societies, or is there room (or social momentum) for the democratisation and internationalisation of knowledge? If traditional parliamentary forms of democracy are losing terrain, what other forms of direct and indirect democracy can supplement or replace it?

The same progressive enlargement of the political arena that created room to incorporate new sectors of the population contributes to weaken the traditional forms of representations (parties and unions). New forms of participation are emerging, for example around new digital technologies and energy technologies, and other forms of basic democracy, but their very fragmentation contributes to greater uncertainty, less political stability and growing frustrations. While it is true that we have witnessed expressive movements to announce that "another world is possible", pathways towards this goal are far from clear.

## **1.5 Production and reproduction**

The period of globalization based on a policy package of neoliberal economic policy has witnessed a series of developments that contribute to increase insecurity among a large share of people with regards to employment and its quality. The overemphasis on maximizing aggregate economic growth is accompanied by declining employment elasticity, especially in developing countries since the early 1990s. While the growth of



the labour force has been declining as a result of the demographic transition, there is a gap between the growth of employment and that of the labour force. In the advanced economies, with the onset of the financial crisis unemployment rates have increased. But in poor developing economies, where social-security networks are missing, unemployment is often a luxury because of the sheer imperative to work for survival. This has meant the continuation of what may be called 'working poor' especially those with a per capita daily income of two PPP dollars. Even for the non-poor employment growth does not always translate itself into secure and/or stable employment of a decent kind being just insecure/unstable employment that is often referred to as informal employment. Informalisation of labour market has been one of the hallmarks of neoliberal driven globalization in the name of labour market flexibility. The world's total labour force now consists of about 2.9 billion people, of which 1.2 billion work in informal employment (ILO). A significant share of workers is also in self-employment because of the lack of opportunities for decent kinds of wage work. Even new employment in the formal sectors of the economy are increasingly of an informal kind, both in developing and developed countries under a variety of practices such as temporary or part-time work with very little social security.

The overarching scenario is one of widespread and increasing prevalence of informal employment driven by 'labour market flexibility' policies. Informality goes with insecurity and hence the predominant form of employment is insecure employment. This has shifted the focus from providing employment-based social security to state assisted social security, often referred to as social protection. While the ILO reports that 77 per cent of workers (in 178 countries) have been covered by laws for old age pension in 2013, the ground reality in most developing countries is a very nominal pension that is not sufficient to provide the basic necessities of life. Unemployment protection in the form of allowance is rare in most developing countries.

The idea of social protection or a system of broad-based social security consists of social/public provisioning for meeting situations of (a) deficiency, and (b) adversity. The former refers to access to basic needs that have to be viewed as entitlements such as food, shelter, health and education and the latter to provisioning for meeting such contingencies as accidents and sickness as well as eventualities as old age and death. Measuring social progress therefore calls for flagging the absence or inadequacy of opportunities for accessing basic entitlements. These may be grouped as:

- access to adequate food, shelter, education and health,
- access to clean and safe environment,
- employment that is stable and secure for a life of dignity, and
- social protection to meet contingencies and eventualities such as old age.

Societies that have gone through progressive transformations are those who have been able to meet the above basic conditions. The challenge is to argue for their promotion as basic entitlements and view economic and social progress from such a perspective as a precondition for other forms of social progress including higher levels of welfare and flourishing.

## **1.6 Demographic change and consumption**

Population growth is still crucial when dealing with sustainable development. In 1804 the world population was 1 billion people, in 1999 it was 6 billion and we are now more than 7 billion. Every day about 200,000 new humans are born. This growth seems to be decelerating, but will still continue for a number of decades (at least 40 more years). This growth is much larger in the poor regions than in the prosperous ones. Unfortunately, the preparatory documents for the coming UN General Assembly and the formal declaration on Sustainable Development Goals seem to ignore the relevance of future population trends:

- Current population growth in Sub-Saharan Africa and in some areas of Asia is unsustainable unless fertility is brought down rapidly in the next two or three decades;
- Very low fertility in Europe, China and in a growing number of countries elsewhere poses a threat to social and economic stability;
- International migration and the absolute lack of supranational governance is - and will be - a powerful factor of international instability;
- Many populations in Africa and Asia are still prisoners of the "Malthusian trap": poverty, high fertility, rapid population growth, environmental deterioration...more poverty etc. At the times of Malthus, it was very difficult to avoid the trap. But modern society has the means, the knowledge, the resources to open the trap. This should be a priority for the coming decades.
- With rising female labour force participation rates, and the difficulties of reconciling unpaid care responsibilities with paid work, more and more women who can afford to are seeking to hire in domestic labour. Much of this labour now takes the form of female migration (global care chains) from poor to rich countries and this has implications for the children of migrant women left behind. Migration, though no much solid evidence is available, seems to be allowing those who do not conform to patriarchal restrictions in their own countries (heterosexual women as well as LGBT people) to escape to countries which are less strict.

Population growth, combined with increasing purchasing power on a mass level, leads to an increasing pressure on natural resources, and highlights global inequalities. To

give a somewhat simplified example: the United States use about a third of the world's energy resources, and house 6 per cent of the world's population. If 18 per cent of the world's population would consume as much energy as US inhabitants do, nothing would be left for the other 82 per cent.

### *The Future*

## **1.7 Actors for social progress**

In a world with such enormous wealth and capacity for generation of output of all kinds, why do we witness this kind of social regress? Clearly there is need for rethinking of current policy perspectives and frameworks for advancing human welfare. The challenge is to articulate an alternative perspective and framework for global level thinking and action. We currently live in a major transitional period. The strong expectations of social progress held around 1960 were based on the following assumptions: (a) that human history was inclined towards progress and (b) that it only required enlightened elites to use (c) functionally efficient state apparatuses to turn this potential into reality. Today, we know: that no such progressive historical trend is granted, and that humankind can regress as much as it can progress; that state elites not necessarily aim at steering national societies, and may neglect this goal to favour corporate economic dynamics making use of state capacities to maximize marketization and commodification; that state apparatuses no longer exercise the same kind of control over society they used to do, due to tighter interdependence between countries, including non-Western (non-Northern) ones, and greater heterogeneity within societies. Under those conditions, the identification of new constellations of actors and new forms of governance and institutional reform are pre-conditions for re-generating expectations for social progress. These actors and structures might exploit new technological opportunities which come with the introduction and wider diffusion of various digital technologies. These allow the emergence of decentralized forms of production, a less resource intensive and sharing economy. Eventually this might lead to a more inclusive form capitalism.

The transitional moment becomes clear because many challenges can no longer be dealt with by national authorities, and not yet by supranational (or world) authorities. As the world becomes increasingly global many questions involving collective goods and "bads" can no longer be restricted to national borders. This may also explain the "negative" attitude of many social movements that say "no" to certain developments and have no positive alternative, because this would require a supranational authority. (The Tobin-tax or the Kyoto-agreement do not really show a

way out.) At the same time, states have acquired new roles to the extent that they are the strategic players within the global order. Even though capital has no motherland and financial flows ignore borders, the persistence of an international political power structure acts as a constraint to the emergence of a supranational authority.

Within this wider context we see a large number of collective actors influencing social developments. These include:

- women's movements. First, an increasing awareness of women's rights. The introduction of "the pill" in 1960 in the US and a few years later in other countries, has contributed to this – as has the rise of women's movements across the globe, and the improvement of education for women. (Of course, there are conservative countermovements, and we should not forget that two-thirds of all women still cannot read, and that violence against women is still endemic.)
- workers' movements, which have however, been seriously weakened in recent decades. According to the International Trade Union Confederation, only seven per cent of the world's active population is currently organized in trade unions. Traditional working-class parties (social democratic, labour, communist) are generally losing terrain.
- reform-oriented religious movements.
- supra-national institutions, such as UNESCO, ILO, etc.
- transnational and national NGOs.

## Chapter 2 - Social Progress: A compass

### **Narrative:**

A compass is useful when it points out a direction in which one might feasibly go. The compass this chapter offers points out many such directions, in many dimensions, helping assure, as we should, that any guidance given is respectful of how progress must be conceived in this pluralistic world. It must also comport with respecting the equal moral standing of all persons. We have striven to identify dimensions that are of basic or non-derivative importance. Some of these dimensions are values, which bear in the first instance on the evaluation of states of affairs, and others are principles, which bear in the first instance on guiding action. In judging social progress or decline, the most important basic values are well-being (itself multi-dimensional), freedom and agency, esteem, and reconciliation & non-alienation. There are also various objective (or “merit”) goods. The most important principles in this context are justice (of various types, esp. distributive justice), respect for basic rights, and charity or beneficence. The agents addressed by these basic considerations are quite varied, and include political and non-political collectives as well as individuals. Attention to this variety of agents suggests the need to attend to additional principles that are not uncontroversially derivable from the foregoing—political principles such as the rule of law, official accountability, and rights of political participation, and ethical principles calling on individuals to cultivate a cooperative and charitable ethos. Using such a multidimensional compass will require a multidimensional understanding of the specific terrain in which one intends to operate and a contextually informed creativity in innovating policies, institutions, and motivating factors that help one along one’s path.

### **Structure of the chapter:**

#### **2.1 The role of a compass for social progress**

*The idea of this first section is to set the stage. We explain how we see the role of the compass (and therefore the role of our chapter in the IPSP-volume).*

- a) The role of a compass: we focus on what would be an “ideal” situation, but we do not neglect feasibility issues. The compass has to clarify different options to define “social progress” and thus offer an orientation for evaluation in the following chapters.
- b) Normative reasoning, facts and uncertainty. What is the normative relevance of uncertainty about the facts? How to take this up in the evaluation? Perhaps refer to examples from chapter 1?
- c) An approach to the idea of progress in a pluralistic, global world: not necessarily linear; path-dependent, possibly branching. This chapter focuses on the normative criteria than can be used to evaluate “changes” (when is it possible to consider a “change” as a “progress”?).

[BOX: a brief sketch of the history of the idea of progress]

- d) An overview of the issues that we will not cover in our chapter (e.g. moral skepticism)
- e) Preview

## 2.2 Fundamental concepts of, and constraints on, the normative assessment of societies

*The second section gives a short overview of concepts and constraints that we consider to be (almost) beyond doubt and that underlie our survey in the following sections.*

- a) Important distinctions that should be kept in mind when reading our chapter:
  - i) values, bearing in the first instance on the evaluation of states of affairs, vs. principles, bearing in the first instance on guiding action (this distinction underlies the division between the following two sections)
  - ii) basic vs. derivative values;
  - iii) basic vs. instrumental values.
- b) Fundamental constraints of moral reasoning:
  - i) Taking adequate account of pluralism.
  - ii) Equality of moral standing (dignity) & mutual respect/recognition as an essential prerequisite for normative reasoning.
  - iii) Non-discrimination.

## 2.3 Basic values

*We first introduce a number of values, which bear in the first instance on the evaluation of states of affairs. In this section we try to define clearly the content of these different values without discussing their relative “priority” or the possible trade-offs between them.*

- a) Well-being: a discussion of different possible approaches to well-being –
  - i) multidimensional (not to forget the possibility of interpersonal interdependence of well-being).
  - ii) pros and cons of different interpretations: subjective (happiness), preference satisfaction, objective notions.
  - iii) broad and narrow definitions of well-being. Other values in this section may contribute to well-being, but can also be considered as relevant even if they do not.
- b) Freedom: discussion of different notions of freedom - agency/autonomy/liberty/non-domination/capabilities.
- c) Esteem.

[BOX on gender, diversity, disability – linked to well-being, esteem, freedom]

- d) Reconciliation, non-alienation.
- e) Objective goods (merit goods) not reducible to the above, e.g. possibly, environmental preservation, cultural thriving & heritage, species preservation, individual life, security.

[possible BOX on intrinsic environmental values]

## 2.4 Basic principles

*After our discussion of values, we turn to basic principles, which bear in the first instance on guiding action. Different principles will also entail a different weighting given to the values discussed in section 3. The choice of principle will be essential in the evaluation of social change (as progress or not).*

- a) Legitimacy (objectively considered), respect of basic rights and liberties.
- b) Justice with its different branches/types (distributive, criminal, reparative).
- c) Distributive justice, examined in more detail:
  - i) Different currencies: well-being, capabilities, resources, etc. (this discussion acts as a bridge between sections 3 and 4).
  - ii) Two relatively uncontroversial principles:
    - (1) Basic needs.
    - (2) Equality of opportunity (cf. luck egalitarianism) versus equality of outcomes.
  - iii) Simple, purportedly more complete, and philosophically more demanding accounts of distributive justice – discussion of different views:
    - (1) Libertarian
    - (2) Sufficientarian (link to discussion about basic needs)
    - (3) Leximin
    - (4) Prioritarian
    - (5) Utilitarianism

[BOX: classification of the different authors in a scheme: (i) X (iv).]

- d) Principles regarding the public promotion of goods. Relationship between “aggregate maximization” (whatever that may mean) and notions of justice:
  - i) Pareto-improvement, Wicksellian unanimity
  - ii) Maximization versus satisficing
- e) Charity/Beneficence
- f) Solidarity/fraternity
- g) Different principles may apply in different spheres

## 2.5 The units of agency and assessment

*The agents addressed by these basic considerations are quite varied, and include political and non-political collectives as well as individuals. We show how the choice of different units impacts on the evaluation of social change.*

- a) Individuals (including a discussion of the time span to be considered – whole lives versus life segments, the shape of a life, the importance of longevity).
- b) Civil society, formal and non-formal institutions, religious communities & institutions.
- c) Nations (including a discussion of the ethical issues concerning boundaries and freedom of movement).
- d) The globe – including a brief discussion on optimal population size (linked to the longevity issue).

**[BOX on collective action problems]**

- e) The ethical status of future generations.
- f) Humans and other animals.

## 2.6 Bringing the analysis to bear more concretely on these different types of agent

*Attention to this variety of agents suggests the need to attend to additional principles that are not uncontroversially derivable from the foregoing. In section 6 we discuss the most important of these additional principles.*

- a) We first discuss the interdependence of individuals and institutions, with causal and instrumental links in both directions. In our chapter we focus on the requirements on each of them. Difference between instantiation and delivery.
- b) Some additional principles specifically applicable to institutions:
  - i) Civil society
  - ii) Political institutions:
    - (1) The rule of law.
    - (2) Accountability, transparency, and responsive institutions.
    - (3) Collective agency: participation & democracy.
    - (4) Determinacy in property rights and securing economic freedoms.
    - (5) Wicksellian (-style) unanimity vs. majoritarian control of optional public spending.

**[BOX: Rawlsian division of labor among institutions.]**



- iii) Social movements and other informal institutions or practices.
- c) Individuals and informal relationships:
  - i) Duties & ethos.
  - ii) Trust (which is also linked to institutions).

## 2.7 Looking ahead—using the compass

*Using such a multidimensional compass will require a multidimensional understanding of the specific terrain in which one intends to operate and a contextually informed creativity in innovating policies, institutions, and motivating factors that help one along one's path.*

- a) Specific applications [to be filled in after we learn more about the other chapters]
- b) The importance of innovating institutions.
- c) Convexities (or, how different values and principles come to be more practically significant in different circumstances without an alteration in the underlying normative view)

[BOX: SDG's: a critical look at how such indicators should be used]

- d) Prospectively using such a multi-dimensional compass in situations of risk and uncertainty.

## **PART I – SOCIO-ECONOMIC TRANSFORMATIONS**

### **Chapter 3. Inequality and social progress**

#### **Narrative:**

- High inequality retards social progress (intrinsically and instrumentally); (Need definition and clear concept of social progress, refer to chapter 2 and possibly SDGs)
- Key drivers and causes of inequality (between and within) are ...
- Policy and politics issues: Hypothesis: Policy matters. Particular policy issues to consider are ....

#### **Structure of the chapter:**

##### **3.1 Why inequality matters**

- Distinction: Tolerable versus problematic inequalities (empirically difficult to distinguish)
- Intrinsic (reliance on theories and empirics)
  - Inequality and social justice
  - Inequality of opportunities, capabilities, primary goods
  - Relational aspects of inequality (power, status)
  - Inequality and its impact on well-being
  - Inequality and impact on inter-generational transmission of inequality
  - (intergenerational inequality: reference to chapter 4)
- Instrumental roles of inequality
  - Positive impacts of inequality (incentives, savings/accumulation)
  - Inequality and its impact on poverty/deprivation
  - Inequality and economic performance (outcomes)
    - The impact of inequality on growth
    - The impact of inequality on governance,
    - The impact of inequality on 'disaffection', social movements
    - The impact of inequality on political participation
    - The impact of inequality on economic, social, and financial stability;
    - Impact on conflict
    - The role of middle classes and top earners;
    - The impact of gender inequality on growth;
    - Interlinkages inequalities in incomes, education, and health

##### **3.2 Different concepts and measures of inequality:**

- National inequality, global inequality, regional/local inequality

- Inequality of what? Outcomes, opportunities, capabilities, freedoms, primary goods?
- Horizontal versus vertical inequality
- Uni-dimensional versus multidimensional inequality
- Income versus wealth inequality
- Absolute versus relative inequality
- Inequality versus polarization
- Objective versus subjective measures (perception of inequality and mobility)
- Static versus dynamic inequality: social mobility and stratification
- Discussion of summary measures of inequality polarization mobility and their policy relevance (maybe appendix with more details?)

### **3.3 Global inequality: Trends and drivers**

- Changing role of within versus between country-country inequality in incomes
- International inequality in education and health
- International poverty trends
- Absolute inequality
- Perceptions of inequality, influence of globalization;
- Trends in size and fortunes of middle classes and top incomes
- Differentials in structural change across the world
- Drivers of growth differences between countries (also see chapter 4)
  - Inequality trends in historical perspective
  - Deep determinants (e.g. geography, demography, endowments, institutions, 'culture', history)
  - Policy drivers of growth (e.g. trade policy, macro policy, industrial policy, governance etc.)
  - Recent drivers (e.g. commodity cycles, resource curse, industrialization and export-led growth in developing countries, secular stagnation?, aid, trade);
  - Regional trends, opportunities and challenges:
    - Sub Saharan Africa
    - Middle East and North Africa
    - Latin America and Caribbean
    - East Asia and Pacific
    - South Asia
    - Mature industrial societies
    - Case Studies (Africa, etc.)

### **3.4 Trends of within-country inequality**

- Measurement challenges
- Similarity and differences in inequality versus poverty measurement;
- Empirical Trends

- Income, education, health, time;
  - By social groups (groups country-specific), gender, regions;
  - Overlapping disadvantages (joint distribution of inequalities)
- Perceptions of inequality and inequality change
- Inequality in access to environmental resources and distribution of damages;
  - Including land inequality
- Levels and trends of inequality of opportunities
- Levels and trends in mobility and inter-generational inequality (link inequality-mobility, Great Gatsby Curve);
- Inequality in political participation and power;
- Gender inequality: levels, drivers, trends, determinants
  - Gender bias in mortality and health
  - Gender bias in education
  - Gender differentials in education and earnings
  - Gender differences in political participation and power
  - Regional trends and drivers
- Spatial inequality
  - Spatial patterns of inequality
  - Rural-urban disparities
  - Migration and spatial inequality
  - Regional inequality
  - Pockets of wealth and poverty

### **3.5 Accounting for within-country inequality trends: immediate determinants**

- Accounting for income inequality change in different parts of the world:
  - Changing inequality in OECD countries
  - Changing inequality in Asia
  - Changing inequality trends in Africa
  - Changing inequality in Latin America
- Educational inequality and its link to income inequality
  - Measuring educational inequality;
  - Impact of educational inequality on employment and earnings;
  - The Paradox of Progress;
- Inequality and labor markets (also see chapter 7)
  - The role of the earnings distribution for overall income inequality;
  - Inequality in participation and pay (including minimum wages);
  - Rent-seeking and top incomes;
  - Role of discrimination;
  - Wage bargaining and its impacts
  - Unemployment, inequality, and subjective well-being;
- Financial markets and inequality
- Resource abundance and inequality (governance issue);

- Health Inequality and link to income inequality
  - Measuring health inequality;
  - Impact of income inequality on health inequality and vice versa;
  - Drivers of health inequality: role of behavioral issues and policy;
  - Reproductive health and gender inequality

### **3.6 Deep drivers of inequality**

- History and path dependence of inequality
  - Role of initial asset inequality
  - Endogenous transmission of inequality (networks, assets, culture)
- Demography, migration and inequality
  - Pace and patterns of the demographic transition;
  - Fertility, reproductive rights and early pregnancy
  - Drivers of the demographic transition;
  - Demographic gifts and burdens;
  - Demography and inequality;
  - Demography and health;
  - Migration flows, economic performance, and inequality trends;
- Link economic-political inequality
  - Influence on national and international policies;
- Role of social stratification
  - Inequality of access to policy
  - Discrimination
  - Inequality of aspirations
- Role of social movements in affecting inequality
  - Unions, labor movements, alliances
- Globalization and Inequality
  - Impact of technological change on inequality in rich and poor countries;
  - Impact of trade, globalization on inequality in rich and poor countries;
  - Impact of financial flows/financialisation

### **3.7 Policy Issues: The scope and limits of policy to affect within-country and global inequality**

- Policy Issues driving between-country inequality
  - National Policy Issues (e.g. infrastructure, health, education)
  - Global policy issues (aid, trade, financial markets, capital flight, tax transparency, investment, property rights)
  - Globalization and international policy space
  - Global socioeconomic governance (chapter 12)
  - Inequality policy and the SDGs
- Policy issues for addressing within-country inequality:

- (Ex ante versus ex post distribution); direct vs. indirect (before, during, after market, order policy accordingly, maybe in form of matrix)
- Addressing group-based inequalities versus individual inequality
- Before market: Education and health policies, assets
- Markets:
  - Macro and trade policy
  - Environmental policies;
  - Labor Market policy (including profit-sharing, basic incomes, rewarding new forms of work, role of automation, unpaid work, relation to work chapter)
  - Financial policy
- After market:
  - Tax policy
  - Government expenditures
  - Social protection
  - Targeted transfers
- Experiences with policies to address inequality
- Governance, policy-making and implementation
- Globalization and national policy space
- The political economy of policy

## Conclusion

## **Chapter 4 Economic growth, human development and planetary welfare**

### **Narrative:**

Chapter 4 is an in-depth examination of growth and the role that it plays in social progress. It begins by examining the different concepts of growth, different narratives and paradigms (e.g. Malthusian, Classical, Marxian, etc.). It looks at the determinants of economic growth, and then evaluates growth in terms of distribution as well as social and natural wealth. The Chapter then moves into an insightful look at governing the commons and the different policy options for addressing growth and associated societal transformations. The different paradigms introduced early in the chapter are revisited to conclude the chapter in light of the discussions in the chapter text.

### **Structure of the chapter:**

#### **4.1 Introduction**

- Concepts and Measurements of Growth (meaning of growth, including ‘new growth’)
- The Great Acceleration / Transition from stagnation to growth. Empirics (Perspectives on Growth (industrialized, emerging and least-developed economies) and Historical Context (growth take-off, preconditions, resource curse and resource endowment)
  - GDP, capital and wealth
  - Inequality
  - Greenhouse gas emissions and other environmental impacts
  - Per capita energy consumption
  - Division of labor between government, civil society and markets
- Correlates
- Narratives: Different narratives of economic growth deliver different assessments of what growing GDP actually means (creating of value vs. consuming our resource base)  
6 paradigms:
  - Malthusian
  - Classical
  - Marxian
  - Piketty and Stiglitz
  - SD and SDGs
  - Gandhi meets Paolo Freire
- Selected voices of discontent

#### **4.2 Historic Determinants of Economic Growth and Stagnation**

- Population and Demography
- Education and Human Capital

- Technological Change, Resource endowments, geography and environment
- Actors, institutions, politics
- Culture, social movements and social capital

### **4.3 Evaluation of Growth, Human Development and Planetary Welfare**

- What Matters (including conceptual discussion of social and natural wealth)
  - Preference satisfaction
  - Happiness
  - Meaning of Life (1. dematerialization of well-being; 2. secularization loss of a greater narrative to which individuals feel belonging/anomie)
  - Capabilities to Function (Sen, Nussbaum)
  - Status Consumption
  - Animal welfare
  - Non-anthropocentric Values, Intrinsic Value of Nature and industrial-technological pollution
  - Political Stability and Legitimacy
- How is it Distributed? Intra-generational and intergenerational justice
  - Global Commons
  - Maximizing the Good
  - Equality
  - Sufficiency / meeting core needs
  - Priority for the Least Advantaged
  - Environmental Justice
- Welfare and wealth: theory and practice (account all factors relevant for wealth by their shadow prices; difficult in practice)

### **4.4 Social and Natural Wealth**

- Social wealth
  - Regional growth rates over time, convergence/divergence of per-capita incomes and the global division of labor
  - Development of inequality on regional and country levels (including in-country inequality)
  - Growth and poverty reduction
  - Social transitions: (Urbanization, culture, post materialization, demography)
  - Political change
  - Economic change
  - Development of consumption patterns in the process of economic growth
- Natural wealth
  - Growth and resource use: a safe-operating space?
  - Climate change
  - Water
  - Food Security



- Biodiversity
  - Depletion of exhaustible resources and resource curse
  - Sustainable Development (sustainability indicators, green GDP)
- Measuring wealth
  - Aggregate indicators, e.g. World Bank's adjusted net savings
  - Disaggregate dashboard à la Stiglitz-Sen-Fitoussi
  - Welfare diagnostics

#### **4.5 Governing the Commons**

- Tragedy of the commons and the neo-classical solution: property rights
- Successful management of the commons: informal institutions and Ostrom's design principles (incl. a few case studies)
- Up-scaling on the global level: poly-centric governance?

#### **4.6 Societal transformations, Policy options and trade-offs**

- Welfare diagnostics: how to assess trade-offs between different objectives that are relevant for welfare?
- Public policy, institutions and trade-offs between growth and distributional impacts; political economy and rent-seeking
- Adjusting to the possibility of slowed future growth, implications of stagnating societies (preparing social systems etc.)
- Robust and context-specific policies
- Narratives about the Future of Growth and their Challenges (Summarizes results of section along different narratives)
  - Malthusian
  - Classical
  - Marxian
  - Piketty and Stiglitz
  - SD and SDGs
  - Gandhi meets Paolo Freire

## Chapter 5. Cities

### Narrative:

- The city as a complex but incomplete system: enables adaptation + innovation
- Today, non-urban economic sectors increasingly have an urban moment: This makes the city also a window into emergent non-urban realities
- We want to show the built-in capacities of urban space to triage, intermediate, constitute the social, the cultural, the economic. Thus the city can accommodate e.g. multiple immigrant communities and multiple global firms. Urban space can enable those without and those with power
- And we want to show how using biology, materials science, and more, we can make the city work with the environment. The need to redesign cities: The compact city.
- But the production of space can be a deeply contested political issue.
- How can urban space itself generate positive outcomes –the city working for the city, as opposed to for elites, global capital, mere extraction of labor and resources
- Emergent experiments in Just Urbanism

### Structure of the chapter:

#### 5.1 Differential Urbanisation Trends

The purpose of this section would be to paint a picture of the highly differentiated and contextual dynamics that unfold as part of long-term urbanisation dynamics. We note that the level, speed and dynamics of urbanisation are very different for different world regions. The basic trend lines in Figure 1 intimate that. However, what we need to foreground is multiple typologies. For example, we could differentiate between:

- urban areas marked by rapid growth (Asia and Africa predominantly)
- urban areas that is characterised by slow growth or stagnation
- urban areas in decline, linked to demographic, economic and environmental dynamics (e.g. in fast growing countries or regions certain parts of the territory could be losing population due to environmental disasters, wars, and so forth)


Another typology pertains to size. Here it probably makes sense to use the categorisation of the United Nations because they have the large data sets and allow us to provide overviews at a national and regional levels:

- mega-cities (10m plus)
- large cities (4-10 million)
- intermediate (1-4 million)

- medium sized cities (300k – 1 million)
- small cities and towns (300k and less)

It will be important to capture the diversities within each of these categories, e.g. the difference between a megacity like Kinshasa, Sao Paolo and Tokyo in terms of, for example, GDP/capita, resource consumption per capita, emissions per capita and so forth.

Figure 1:



The final dimension of categorisation could be “urban forms”. This is the most fuzzy at this stage but we thought it is important to capture the emergent spatial forms of the contemporary era as intra urban inequality worsens, linked to a de-linking of the middle-classes and elite from the public city, which has implications for the capacity to address the city as a single open system. It also allows us to talk about the significance of mobile and vulnerable populations.

## 5.2 Black holes in our thinking and concepts

### 5.3 Urban and non-urban interferences

Non-urban economic circuits increasingly have an urban moment.

Thus the city becomes a point for intervention regarding both urban and non-urban challenges: e.g. environmental sustainability and social justice, etc.

### 5.4 Gendering of urban design and planning

### 5.5 New challenges for which cities are not prepared

(climate change, rise of itinerants –from professionals to low-wage workers–, refugees)

## 5.6 What is urban well-being?

This section will draw on the definitional work done in Chapter 2 and urbanise it so to speak. In the discussions that far we have identified three different, possibly complementary registers within which to think about the dimensions of urban well-being.

- i. Right-based perspective: Here the important work pioneered in Latin America, building on the perspectives of Henri Lefebvre and David Harvey, and increasingly taken up by transnational civil society organisations, could be a touchstone. It enables a refocusing of the debates on fundamental question of urban abandonment and destitution that is in stark evidence in urbanising societies in Africa and (South) Asia, but of course also prevalent to lesser extents in other geographies. This approach also allows for a strong gender-based perspective in thinking through normative horizons and goals for urban futures.
- ii. There was also a strand in the discussions that gestured towards a more affective and corporeal sensibility of an urban horizon, e.g. can we think what an ***architecture of love and flourishing*** may look like and feel like in the city?
- iii. Lastly, we acknowledge the emergence of technocratic visions of urban well-being which turns on algorithmic governance and management premised on technological infrastructures and, in some versions, universal access.

It will be important to provide a perspective on how the urban normative horizon can be thought about in different ways and how making sense of urban transitions it makes sense to know how we ground or imagine urban futures. Here we could invoke the importance of taking the perspective or positionality of the “omitted subject”.

## 5.7 Barriers to a Just Urban Society

In this section we need to lay bare the drivers and dynamics of what Maarten Haajer calls, “default urbanism”; this is an evocative term to capture the mainstream models of urban development, often shot through with neoliberal managerial assumptions, but not exclusively.

It will be important to capture the regional specificities of default urbanisms. To state the obvious: default urbanism in China is very different to what is the default in the US or Latin America or the Middle-East. Here we need to ensure that the regional expertise of the members can come through.

On the back of this discussion we can then set out the main dynamics of territorial inequality; enclave urbanism; unexpected social threads, e.g. religious attachments and networks.

## 5.8 Politics of urban transformation and urban space itself

Here the suggestion is to invoke an imaginary of how to create “a race for alternatives” to default urbanism—the spatial manifestation that there is no alternative. How can urban innovations at the margins become the new norm through social processes? Invoke an alternative imagination and new cultural vision: claiming the urban commons: radical inclusion and social justice.

One clear horizon is **radical localisation** that intimates the possibility of grounded and embodied citizenship. A second horizon relates to **new territorial bases for inter- and intra-urban solidarity**, exchange and economic development. These imply a new kind of institutional scaffolding which demands a recasting of urban governance and management. With this in mind, one can then explore some of the specific priority topics for the future urban society:

- mobile and precarious populations
- integrated infrastructure systems and universal access to basic services (connects with half of the SDGs): mobility, energy, water and sanitation, waste, education, health, security, cultural infrastructure, public space and the commons.
- land availability and land-use, including regulatory regimes
- food security systems
- citizenship
- future of work as constitutive of place-making and covering costs of urban reproduction
- governance and finance approaches.

[coming from a former section entitled “experiments in just urbanism”] This section will also examine experiments in Just Urbanism: setting out of the conceptual frame and exploring the dynamics of their intersections through emergent experiments.

The conceptual approach is that we will scan for **innovative emergent practices** in all of these dimensions. Keep in mind that resource flows (urban metabolism) connect to infrastructure systems (energy, water, waste, data, etc.) that we are asked to address in the original outline.

The urban form aspect will enable us to get into questions of (highly speculative) land market politics, which includes the whole spectrum of land grabs to tenure security, etc. It also gives us an entry to engage with the politics of compaction, to shift the focus to culturally specific dynamics of land-use and questions of “intensification”.

At the core of the future city is of course the question of consumption, which is denoted “cultural expectations”; the idea is to move away from a static conception of social and economic reproduction in the city, but rather look at conventional and surprising ways in which urban services and goods are provided; need to be provided in the future in terms of environmental limits and satisfying basic needs of urban citizens.

The dynamic interactions between urban metabolism, urban form and consumptions imperatives are being intermediated by technology and especially the promise of new technological capabilities that can alter the underlying dynamics of the city as complex open system. Importantly, we want to deliberately critique a high tech imagination and rather foreground the importance of socially embedded and possibly mid-level technologies, and most importantly, pluralism and open-source platforms.

A final dimension of this reframing is the question of **financial flows** that underpin the dynamic reproduction of the city but also ground the political dynamics of the system. The one set of issues are tied to the constraining/disciplining dynamic of financial registers; the other would be new sources of finance that is consistent with new approaches to infrastructure provision.

What are the dynamics of aggregating these experiments towards systemic change.

### **5.9 Recommendations for alternative urban futures**

This will pull together the implications for public policy based on the argument constructed before. It will also be where the connections with cross-cutting themes will be addressed explicitly.

## **Chapter 6. Markets, finance and corporations: does capitalism have a future?**

### **Narrative:**

- How do modern capitalist financial institutions affect inequality and the distribution of wealth?
- What role does the corporation play in shaping political power (and how has that changed over time and place)?
- To what degree does a market orientation (as opposed to other forms of allocation) inhibit or foster inclusive innovation and solutions to social and environmental challenges?

### **Structure of the chapter:**

#### **6.1 What are the distinct elements of capitalism?**

#### **6.2 What is the relationship between aspects of social progress and institutions of capitalism?**

- Inequality
- Addressing Human Needs
- Political Power
- Innovation and Opportunity

#### **6.3 Boundaries to Capitalism / Alternatives to Capitalism**

#### **6.4 Options for the Future**

## Chapter 7. The future of work: good jobs for all?

### Narrative:

The world of work is constantly changing. Demographic shifts, technological innovations, institutional reforms and global economic integration affect the way people work. Both the demand and the supply of labor is fundamentally different from earlier times. Over the last decades, the global labor force has increased, and it has become more diverse in terms of age, gender and ethnicity. Technological innovations have a major impact on occupations and industries, changing the ways economies in different world regions, in both developed and developing countries, work along with new division of labor that are facilitated by global economic integration. Taking a global perspective we can also see growing diversity in terms of job types ranging along the whole continuum from permanent formal employment to different forms of non-standard work, in particular part-time work, fixed-term contracts and agency work to on-call work and the large segment of informality. Increasing flexibility can also be observed with respect to working time and mobile working. While today's labor markets can probably create more jobs than in earlier decades, the issues of unemployment, worklessness, exclusion and discrimination are far from being solved, neither is the potential physical and mental health hazards involved in some work environments. Against this backdrop, policy choices at the global, national, regional or sectoral level are essential, taking into account the different context conditions. Therefore, core policy areas such as education and training at different stages in life, collective bargaining and wage setting, but also the role of labor market regulation, social protection and active labor market policies needs to be addressed, trying to strike a new balance between flexibility and security in order to stimulate the creation of more good jobs for all.

### Cross-cutting topics and interconnections with other chapters

Since cross-cutting topics will not be treated in separate chapters, they are expected to be referred to throughout the report and should also be addressed in our chapter/sections, when appropriate. This will be the case of topics on:

- **science, technology and innovation:** how the research and innovation process interacts with labor market dynamics, mainly through the emergence of new job opportunities, tasks profile, skill requirements and employment relations;
- **globalization:** it creates economic opportunities both for firms and workers, and threatens established national and/or local work regulations, work cultures, social actors, global distribution of labor and human resources management strategies;



- **social movements:** social progress is not mainly the work of official authorities, unions and/or entrepreneurial leadership; a broader variety of actors engaged in social transformation have to be considered both for the analysis of trends in work and labor market, and for understanding how new justice principles related to employment situation emerge and consolidate;
- **belonging/exclusion:** labor relations involve not just resources and power, but also identity and recognition, specially when intense migration and diversity coexist with growing inequalities and new patterns of discrimination.
- **health:** flexibility and new working conditions, job intensification as well as long term unemployment and/or job instability are strongly connected with health conditions of the labor force; dangerous and stressful work are main issues in any inquire on job conditions in contemporary working places

On the other hand, some chapters will address subjects connected to Chapter 7 agenda, although they do not have labor markets as a core element in their analyses. Exploring those links and interconnections is a relevant strategy to avoid the risk of an encyclopedia style of approaching subjects in the final publication. This the case of chapters 3 (on inequality), 6 (on corporations), 8 (on social justice) of the two chapters on socio-economic governance (11/12). as well as chapters on disability aspects (17) and education (18).

## **Structure of the chapter:**

### **7.1 Introduction**

- Driving forces such as technology, globalization, demography/labor force participation/women/older workers, regulation, public policies and other factors
- Definition of work – continuum, from paid to unpaid, formal to informal, insiders and outsiders...
- Global indicators and regional differences
- Relation with SDG (if relevant for labor market issues)

### **7.2 New technologies, globalization and the future of work - shifts in demand for labor and skill types**

- **Technology: old, new and diffused**
  - ‘work intensity’
  - Relevance for new technology in different contexts and diffusion
  - Implications for occupations, tasks, jobs, skills

- ICT and other technologies
- **The role of globalization** – with old and new technology, adaptations, uneven development
  - Measurement and accounting
  - Dissemination of knowhow
  - Global distribution of labor and offshoring, competition
- **Shifts in labor demand and future of work** – worklessness? Surplus population?
  - labor demand - Future of manufacturing and service occupation business services, private services, care... knowledge-intensive work
  - Job polarization

### 7.3 Changes and prospects on employment relations

- Post-WWII standard employment relationship – more flexibility (driven by multiple factors) - more diverse types of jobs, in particular non-standard work
- temporary agency work and labor market intermediaries on-call work,
- project work, freelance, self-employment, independent contractors
- Informal economy (employees and employers), own account workers (developing countries) and role of globalization, multinationals

### 7.4 More flexible workplaces and working time?

- Working time arrangements – longstanding patterns, trends and emerging patterns
- Mobile working (by digital workers)
- Work schedules and negotiated flexibility (flextime, 'right to request' adjusted work hours, etc.)
- Involuntary and chosen forms of part-time work
- Working at home
- Concluding Social Progress assessment

### 7.5 Exploring the boundaries of the labor market: Unemployment, inactivity, exclusion

- Differences and inequalities in unemployment and labor market participation
- Core of unemployment, job search and discouraged workers...
- Problematic aspects of unemployment, boundaries, long-term unemployment and inactivity – e.g. NEET

## **7.6 Diversity and discrimination**

- *Diversity*
- *Discrimination*
- Gender: women and paid/unpaid employment, employment patterns, careers, wages etc., (lone) motherhood
- Disability and health issues
- Youth employment
- Ageing and older workers
- Minorities
- Migration

## **7.7 The impact of work and employment on health and wellbeing**

- Social inequalities in access to (good) work
- Unemployment, worklessness and health
- Dangerous work and health, occupational accidents etc.
- Stressful work and health in the era of globalization: flexibility and new forms of work; ambivalence of autonomy; pressure and overtime work; insecurity and precarious work; injustice, unfairness, exclusion
- Interventions at different levels – companies, workers, unions

## **7.8 Collective bargaining, trade unions, wage setting and minimum wages**

- Broad developments in collective bargaining and unionization
- Collective bargaining autonomy and government intervention, coordination, decentralization
- Minimum wages (wage setting and wage dispersion)
- Future of trade unions and/or alternative organizations of workers – social movements
- Solidarity in times of diversity – solidarity among whom, inclusive trade unions

## **7.9 Human capital formation**

- Schooling: General human capital
  - Discuss the issues of the technology of the life cycle skill formation

- Critical period
  - Sensitive period
  - The development of learning, proficiency and socio-emotional abilities
  - The role of the early childhood investments
  - Schooling in the developing world: The role of credit constraints
- Vocational training : Specific human capital
  - The trade-offs between general and specific human capital investments
    - Short term and long term benefits
    - Firm's vs. individual's investments
    - Public vs. private investments
  - "In class" training vs. "on the job" training
  - The challenges of the matching between the structure of the supply of the vocational training and the structure of the occupations in the labor market
    - Intermediates
- Tertiary education
  - The structures of the tertiary education
  - The challenges of the matching between the structure of the supply of the tertiary education and the structure of the occupations in the labor market
  - The financing of the tertiary education
  - (overeducation, skill mismatch)
- Life-long learning
  - The challenges of the adaption and acquisition of new skills along the life cycle in aging societies

## **7.10 Labor market regulation and social protection**

What has been done? What has this done to the labor market? What should be done?

- Employment protection: dismissal protection, fixed-term contracts, agency work regulation – dualization
- Tax and benefit systems (unemployment, assistance, disability...), social protection and anti-poverty policies
- Active labor market policies and activation: measures and effects
- Welfare state, flex-security, institutional change
- Labor standards

### 7.11 Summary

- Main insights
- What should/can actors do?

## Chapter 8. Social Justice, well-being and economic organization

### Narrative:

- Social justice comprises developing the capabilities of all people and their well being to the extent possible, with extra resources to the disadvantaged.
- Unregulated capitalism as a system is incapable of achieving social justice and sustainable improvements in well being
- Markets are necessary but substantial regulation is needed to prevent the extreme concentration of income and wealth
- The claim that substantial inequality of material wealth is necessary to provide incentives for innovation and productivity is theoretically flawed and empirically false
- We propose a set of alternative reforms

### Structure of the chapter:

#### 8.1 What are social justice and well-being?

Social justice is developing the capabilities of all people and their well being to the extent possible, with emphasis on extra resources to persons with disadvantaged environments.

Well being definitions. Subjective vs objective perspectives. New measures currently in use. Coordinate with Ch 2.

#### 8.2 Failures and successes of existing systems

Has capitalism succeeded in advancing Social Justice? Yes, compared with feudalism. What is capitalism? The pure form is an economic system with market transactions including markets for labor and capital, with relatively little state intervention.

Key problems: Based on, and glorifies greed – homo economicus. Leads to vast concentration of wealth and income in the hands of the few, which leads to political domination, even in democratic systems. When a system is based upon and glorifies greed, no set of rules can satisfactorily solve the resulting pathologies.

How well did 20<sup>th</sup> century socialism do, and what led to its failures? 1) lack of markets and 2) political autocracy. Political competition between parties is a necessary although insufficient condition for political accountability. *There is no example of single-party rule, no matter how lofty its stated intentions, that has remained popularly accountable.*

Have there been advances in social justice over the last 100 years? Yes where variations on pure capitalism have been explored. What aspects of capitalism should be retained? Markets, b/c of their ability to decentralize economic activity. A role for private ownership of firms --- different forms of ownership

Is capitalism necessary? If one believes that *unlimited material incentives* are necessary to produce innovation, then yes. But we challenge this claim. Examples to support this challenge to the necessity of allowing unlimited greed: Scandinavia, the role of social organization and the public sector, etc.

Comparison of economic development models in their effect on social justice, not all are equally good/bad.

### 8.3 Domains for increasing social justice and well-being

Distinguish between economic, social and political feasibility. Evolution of existing institutions vs Creation of new ones. Gradualism versus Big bang reforms. Distribution of income, power and opportunities.

What aspects can be changed:

- Compressing wages and income differentials via social organization (unions etc)
- distribution of wealth, through capital and inheritance taxation
- increased role for public capital,
- increased re-distribution of income through taxation
- massive focus on education of the disadvantaged to equalize opportunities
- Empowerment
- Gender, race, disability policies

Examples from both developed and developing economies appear in each topic.

Some claims:

- The gains from globalization can become bigger by sharing them more equally.
- Social movements can benefit by implementing social equality as a development strategy. It consists of a low level of inequality and a high level of social insurance. It is good for economic growth and development.
- The political and economic feasibility of equality: i) nice but pricy or ii) contested but advantageous? We argue: Social equality is as economic feasible to developing countries today as it was for Sweden in the 1950s. Political feasibility is more problematic.
- No successful country-experience offers ready recipes for how other countries can escape poverty, underdevelopment, and corruption.

- Nobody can engineer trust and prosperity by importing institutions from other countries. But learning from others is different from imitating them.

## **A. Social Welfare Policies and Taxation**

- The design of welfare policies
- The welfare state enhances productivity and capability
- More capable workers induce more capital investments
- The political support for welfare spending

The welfare state enhances productivity and capability. *This section focuses on outcomes:* It demonstrates how welfare spending can make the poor stronger and enable them to enhance their ability to work and fight

- eliminate poverty traps via social insurance and safety nets
- empower weak groups to stand up against land owners, strongmen and employers
- make the poor less vulnerable and politically stronger
- prevent farmers from stress sales of assets
- help many millions who go hungry even in the good years
- encourage necessary risk-taking to obtain higher yielding crops
- enhance workers' capabilities
- encourage poor families to keep their children in school
- raise education levels and the health of the population, which again affect the productivity
- establish a fairer and more equitable society.

More capable workers induce more capital investments. We can explain how i) more capable and healthy workers increase the profitability of investing in high productivity equipment, and how ii) welfare spending is complementary to market dynamics more generally.

The political support for welfare spending. We can explain how the political support for welfare spending depends on social conditions and the (pre tax) distribution of income. The welfare state is least developed where it is most needed.

- It is a misunderstanding that the welfare state is a mechanism of pure redistribution from the rich to the poor. It is not. If it were, a huge inequality should generate high support for more welfare spending. We demonstrate that countries with the smallest pre-tax income inequality have the largest and most generous welfare states.
- It is a misunderstanding that the welfare state is a drag on the dynamics of economic development. We demonstrate that the welfare state is most developed in countries that are most exposed to international competition ---in the small open economies north in Europe.
- It is a misunderstanding that the political demand for welfare spending goes up when inequality (before taxes and transfers) is high. It reinforces the initial wage compression via political adjustments. Equality creates support for more equality. Wage compression



increases welfare spending which again lead to wage compression from below as social insurance empowers vulnerable groups.

- Economic and social equality can multiply due to the complementarity between wage determination and welfare spending. Barth and Moene find an equality multiplier of more than 50 per cent, using data for 18 countries over 35 years. Any exogenous change in either welfare spending or wage setting is thus magnified in the long run by 50 per cent by endogenous forces caused by social complementarity.

Social welfare policies require compatible tax regimes. Control concentration of wealth. Inheritance policy.

## **B. Work, Labor institutions, and wage inequality**

- Unions --- democratic versus corrupt institutions
- Wage compression – causes and consequences
- Profits and top incomes

Unions, work rules, procedural justice in hiring/firing, how stable is work, holiday/leisure policy, vocational education etc.

- Workers are working under different rules and the union as a labor market institution does not mean the same thing in all countries. It varies from institutions for control by workers to institutions for control of workers. In northern Europe unions are semi-democratic institutions of worker autonomy and involvement. In other countries they are corrupt institutions for rent seeking and political oppression. It is important to trace out these differences.
- Where unions are controlled by their members they compress the wage differentials over the bargaining unit. An economy can offer higher wages for the great majority by wage moderation at the top of the pay scale.
- The higher average productivity and smaller wage differentials that follow from compression stimulate new social policies of health, education, and social insurance.
- Higher income and lower inequality contribute to higher political demand for social welfare spending, a more progressive social policy that can provide better health care, improved education and more social protection.
- Social spending feeds back to the processes of job creation and wage formation.
- The strategy of social equality is to prepare for the political and economic feasibility to work together in a virtuous circle.
- Developing countries normally use modern technology in some applications, but developed countries apply modern technology more widely.

- The gap between the most efficient and least efficient technology in use reflect level of wage inequality.
- Is the US economy the most modern economy in the world? A jump from the first to the ninth decile in the productivity distribution implies a 330 per cent increase in the US and a 2140 per cent increase in India --- but only 123 per cent increase in Norway. More developed and more egalitarian countries have smaller productivity gaps.
- Wage compression induces a high level of innovation, structural change and a high level of average productivity.
- Wage compression can be done in various ways. The Scandinavian way is to take wage setting out of market competition and place it in a system of collective decision making. The South-Korean way is to subsidise skill formation and education to drive down the local wage premiums.
- Executive pay is not covered by union contracts. Yet it is the countries with low unionization that have the highest salaries relative to the average wage. Employers keep executive pay more in check Scandinavia than in the more backward capitalist economies like the US and UK.

### **C. Alternative ownership structures**

- Profit sharing
- Participatory firm
- Worker ownership
- Employee stock owner plans
- Public ownership
- Public-private hybrids
- Union Control with capitalist ownership
- Land ownership

We compare how they work and discuss their economic and political feasibility.

### **D. Finance for the poor**

- Formal versus informal finance'
- The promises of microfinance --- the poor pay back, but do they get out of poverty?
- Saving banks as a social movement – why so little attention today?
- Subsidized finance of education and training ---a core feature of welfare spending?

The lack of existing financial institutions for the poor is a serious problem. How improve the access to the poor with no collateral to lend with.

There are different kinds of lending that don't fall into this sort of lending framework. What is the experience from such banks as the CLP in Mondragon, owned by its employees and its member firms. There are other state bank solutions etc also— financial institutions can be a form/link to social welfare

## **E. Gender, race and age policies**

Details to be added

## **8.4 Provision of public goods**

**A. Environmental policies**  
(global warming as e.g.)

**B. Intergenerational inequality, justice**

## **8.5 Alternative Visions for Promoting Progress**

Connection between equality and growth. There is a strong presumption that you need huge inequality to have innovation. Countries with smaller gaps have more innovation in practice, however. Post WWII US also an example. Rapid growth, less inequality, high productivity and innovation.

### **A. Society models**

- Social democracy
- Democratic Capitalism
- Union control with capitalist ownership
- Markets without capitalists

### **B. Competition within and between systems**

### **C. Globalization and society models**

### **D. Migration and society models**

## **PART II - POLITICAL REGULATION, GOVERNANCE AND SOCIETAL TRANSFORMATIONS**

### **Chapter 9. The paradoxes of democracy and the rule of law**

#### **Narrative:**

- Spread of democracy in states but disjunction of power from democratic spheres. Direct penetration of democratic spaces by private interests
- Formal equality provided by rule of law but substantive inequality
  - Citizenship is equal but substantive inequalities
  - Citizenship linked to state but spheres of action are not confined to state. Rescaling, migration
  - Some civil rights extended but social and economic rights restricted
  - Rule of law but access to law restricted
  - Power of judiciary, buying of law
- Democracy corrupted by:
  - Private power, buying power
  - corruption
  - Populism
  - Rise of professional political class
- State loses control of economic and social policy but repressive capacity increased.
- Democracy and dissent, management of dissent but have to allow dissent.
- Lack of transparency
- Hegemonic ideologies undermine democratic choice
- Vocabulary, terms appropriated by power – governance, stakeholder, citizen/customer'

#### **Structure of the chapter:**

##### **9.1 Democracy and the Challenges of Political Representation**

Social progress on a wide range of issues requires that mass publics—and not merely elite actors—achieve effective political representation through democratic channels. The construction of durable and effective representative institutions, however, remains one of the weakest links in democratic regimes in much of the world. Even relatively stable democratic regimes often “underperform” when it comes to ensuring that working and lower class interests, ethnic minorities, and other traditionally excluded groups have effective voice and influence in decision-making processes. Representational deficits, therefore, often give rise to a panoply of disruptive tendencies in modern democracies, from electoral volatility to mass social protest and the emergence of populist outsiders who challenge political establishments.

Traditional models of democratic representation assign a leading role to political parties in the articulation, aggregation, and representation of diverse societal actors and interests. Contemporary social science scholarship, however, has identified numerous ways in which political parties are failing to perform these representative functions. In many established democracies, parties have become entrenched in state institutions while allowing their societal roots to wither. In many new democracies in developing societies, party systems remain fluid, shallow, and poorly institutionalized, offering relatively weak channels of representation for diverse popular sectors. These representational deficits are often a source of considerable discontent and detachment on the part of citizens from established democratic institutions. They also, however, provide inspiration for new forms of social and political organization and participation that offer the potential to correct existing deficiencies. New social movements, non-governmental organizations, and civic networks of varied sorts have thus emerged to supplement or displace traditional forms of partisan representation, and in some countries they have spawned new types of party organizations with deeper roots in civil society.

What, then, is the future of democratic representation, and how can its increasingly plural forms be harnessed to the goals of social progress? These questions lie at the heart of the democratic dilemma in contemporary societies, and they are integral to efforts to establish the rule of law in an inclusive manner that protects and responds to the full range of societal interests.

## **9.2 Rights and citizenship**

Scholarship and public policy debates on human rights and citizenship have broadly been situated in liberal democratic societies, where the predominant concerns have been the integration of migrants and managing national minorities, with the presumption of a trajectory towards legal citizenship in the given nation-state. More recently, the changing conditions of global migration are said to be posing challenges for citizenship in liberal democratic societies. One question raised is whether there should be the assumption of a trajectory towards citizenship.

Indeed, some have argued that we are witnessing the demise of 'national' citizenship, and that instead rights are available to non-citizens through 'postnational' means. For example, Yasmeen Soysal now famously argued in her seminal work, *Limits of Citizenship* (1994), that postnational membership is on the ascendency in Europe, based on her study of German guestworkers in Germany. This is attributed to globalization, and the rise of international human rights discourses and legal norms, as well as international and regional institutional mechanisms, and as a result, rights are no longer exclusive to citizens but available to permanent residents. In contrast, others, for example Nash (2009) has argued that international human rights laws and norms cannot operate outside of national politics. Going further, Nash (2009) has eloquently argued that human rights discourses and legislation has led to greater inequalities through creating a number of substatuses, and that it is only through citizenship that 'we become human' and claim rights (Douzinas, 2000).

Certainly, in the Arab world, we can observe significant non-citizen populations, for example, in the Gulf countries with large migrant worker populations, or in Lebanon, where, in a population of 4.7 million, approximately 500,000 are Palestinian refugees, many of whom are now third generation stateless refugees. In addition, with the unfolding of the ongoing Syrian crisis, there are approximately 1.5 million Syrian refugees. Whilst Lebanon is often cited as an example in the Arab world of managing ethnic and religious diversity given its consociational power-sharing governance system, there is no route to citizenship for the long-resident Palestinians, nor unsurprisingly for the more recently arrived Syrian refugees.

Moreover, multiculturalism is evident as a discourse at the level of international organisations where respect for minority rights is a normative expectation also being applied to Arab states (as also is migrant workers' rights, refugees' rights, women's rights and increasingly rights for sexual minorities). Yet it is conspicuous in its absence at the regional level (eg Arab League, the Organisation of the Islamic Conference), and at the national level, whilst there are some forms of minority accommodation (e.g. Lebanon), they have not had a transformatory role towards an inclusive citizenship, where democracy or the move towards democracy is divorced from minority rights.

### 9.3 Corruption

It is no matter of controversy – political or academic – that corruption could be curbed by reducing the monopoly rents and arbitrary power in their political or bureaucratic allocation, enhancing an open competition in the private and public sectors, increasing transparency and accountability of public actors, introducing more effective controls and feedback mechanisms on the outcomes of public policies, strengthening moral barriers and societal control over the public sphere. It is an open question, however, under which political and institutional conditions effective reforms will be realistically approved and implemented to reduce the diffusion of corruption. Heavily influenced by a rational choice paradigm, policy-makers and researchers have not paid attention to the role of changes in capitalism and democracy on the spread and modelling of new patterns of corruption. Recent research on corrupt exchanges in times of neoliberalism, in fact, points at those policies as rather part of the problem, not the solution.

In the last decades a chain of scandals fuelled a growing popular awareness of the relevance of corruption as an hidden factor which may negatively affect political and economic decision-making in public policies – in terms of growing ineffectiveness and inequality – not only in less developed and authoritarian regimes, but also in advanced capitalist liberal-democracies. A corresponding interest came out also within the social sciences but, in spite of a large scientific debate, there is still no consensus on any commonly accepted definition of what corruption is. A predominant paradigm, however, emerged in the literature: according to the economic approach, corruption is the rational response to contextual opportunities, generated by a certain type of distortion – to be distinguished by other abuses – of the relationship between a principal (the state, in case of corruption in the public sphere) and agents induced by a third-actor, the corruptor. The latter, through an hidden transaction, prompts the agent to violate constraints imposed by (formal and informal) rules which should safeguard the principal's interests. By offering him money or other rewards, the corrupter obtains from the public agent favourable decisions, reserved information, protection. In the

exchange between the agent and the corruptor *property rights* on resources created and allocated as a consequence of the public agent's activity and influence are shared between the two. The agent modifies (or maintain, having the power or legal duty to modify) to the advantage of the briber such allocation of property rights, obtaining as a reward a fraction of the value thus created (i.e. the bribe).

The economic perspective provided the theoretical toolbox underlying anticorruption policies, measures and reforms recommended by inter-governmental and international organizations (Oecd, World Bank, United Nations, IMF, European Union), often as a prerequisite for the subsequent distribution of economic aids and investments. In this perspective, in fact, corruption is the unavoidable result of the overextended, hyper-regulated and hyper-regulating, unaccountable operations of an interventionist State, through decision-making processes monopolized by public agents aiming at the creation and allocation of rents. Such explanations of the diffusion of bribery ultimately rely on the intervention of the State in the markets, in terms of both public services and regulation: as a corollary, free market are invoked as the ultimate solution for the effectiveness of anticorruption reforms, having privatization, liberalization, cuts in public spending, and deregulation as the cornerstones of any recommended policy. The structure of values underlying the so-called neo-liberal paradigm – prevailing since 1980s' in western democracies economic and social policy-making, after the cycle of collective mobilization of the 1960s and 1970s – fits with such policy perspective, but has its drawbacks

It is not just the regulative framework (or better the de-regulative policy approach) underlying neoliberalist policies which may be corruption-enhancing, as exemplified in the frequent evidence of bribes paid to manipulate privatization processes. The attempt to reduce state's role in the economy unavoidably creates a quantity of un-regulated, opaque, unaccountable interactions between public agents, private corporations and other "strong" economic and financial interests, which may interfere with the functioning of markets (private corruption distorts market relationships as well) precisely as with the expected integrity of public officials. Moreover, such policies have augmented the power of giant corporations, increasing their monopoly power and therefore favouring collusive interactions with state's agents. Finally, an "amoral" justifications of the pursuit of profits depends on the strengthening of a structure of values opposite to any conceivable notion of public ethics and public spiritedness, when public integrity is less prized than private success, profits matter more than observing ethical standards, monetary rewards more than symbolic achievements. When shared and transmitted through socialization processes, amoral conceptions and practices of capitalism may bring to the application of a similar "market fundamentalism" also in the relationship between private and public agents. Since corruption in a democratic decision-making implies the substitution of a demand-supply logic to the universalistic principles of the rule of law, we may expect that amoral neoliberalism as an internalized set of values produces a twofold effect: first, it weakens normative and moral barriers against corruption; secondly, being involved in corrupt practices, i.e. applying a market logic within a "bureaucratic" and "state-centred" environment, may produce within circles of agents involved in illicit acts a self-legitimizing stance, therefore reversing into some sort of moral benefit the practice of corruption itself.



Any liberal-democratic regime settles through institutional constraints a boundary between political power – i.e., the power deriving from the occupation of certain roles of public authority – and economic power – i.e. the power deriving from the operation of the market process. We can therefore look at corruption as a practice – more or less “institutionalised” in itself – that covertly converts economic into political resources and vice versa, therefore blurring the “official” frontier between them. A *market for the exercise of public authority* substitutes official rules which should provide “rule of law” criteria in the allocation of public goods. It is paradoxical to invoke privatization as a remedy against corruption, since behind any form of corruption lies precisely a hidden and unaccountable *privatization* of public resources by public agents, which are preferentially assigned to those who have more monetary, political or relational resources to offer in exchange.

In modern democracies corruption, in fact, cannot be considered as a mere “abuse of entrusted power for private gain” – according to the definition most widely used in the literature – but as a social practice which tends to develop its own self-reproducing mechanisms of diffusion and dissimulation, through learning processes and adaptive expectations of actors involved in complex networks of illegal exchange. In a vicious circle, money (not only bribes and other illegal financing, but also formally regular contributions) and political power feed upon each other, deeply distorting the channels of political representation and therefore fostering public indignation, frustration and mistrust. As a matter of fact, in the last decade rampant corruption has been denounced by social movements and social scientists alike. More specifically, in the practice of “grand corruption” a minority of individuals belonging to the ruling class (politicians, high-level bureaucrats, public managers, entrepreneurs, professionals) jointly appropriate public resources and common goods – public budget, environmental assets, political consent, etc. – trying at the same time to minimize visibility, public recognisability, and criminal risks of the corresponding activities, therefore reducing both vertical and horizontal accountability of decision-makers. As a consequence, besides the socially wasteful outcome of such rent-seeking activities, an increase in the opacity of decision-making, a further escalation of economic and political inequalities, an adverse selection in political, economic and professional careers can be observed.

## 9.4 Judiciary

Ever since the 1960s, the social and political role of courts has dramatically changed, prompting a shift in the allocation of political authority within representative democracies and a new balance of power. Although the intensity and the timing of this transformation has differed from one country to another, the judicial branch has been endowed with new functionalities (social change, policy reform, symbolic politics of identity recognition, market regulation, etc.) and has become a central and relatively autonomous arena for the mediation of political and social interests.

Overall, this rise of the judiciary has triggered optimistic scholarly discourses on its emancipatory and democratic potential of this new path, taking “law” out of the hands of bureaucrats and politicians and back to the “people” and civil society. While there is no denying that courts have given a new momentum to a variety of rights, this optimistic vision should be nuanced by considering the many ambivalences of judicialization processes. First, courts are not just one land of opportunity *equally* open and accessible to citizens regardless of their social or professional status. They have their own set of repeat players (big law firms and large interest groups) that have resources to pursue long-run interests in changing the state of the law through litigation. Second, courts develop a selective



understanding of rights through the depoliticizing and individualizing claims that is oft implied in judicial petitioning, thereby sidelining the promotion of social and labor rights. Third, in the context of crisis of parliamentary democracy, processes of judicialization can prove particularly corrosive when it seems that constitutional courts and judges end up settling up most of the 'hard cases' of contemporaries democracies in lieu of.

This synopsis suggests that we recognize this whole new terrain of politics with its own dynamics and pitfalls, and question how the rise of courts and law can be better articulated to the circuit of representative politics and better harnessed to the objectives of social progress.

## **9.5 Inequality**

Rising inequality constitutes a threat to democracy. It is beyond the role of economic theory itself to encompass this, as damage done to democracy by capitalist behaviour may seem to be an externality for economic theory, but it threatens to internalize itself in important ways. The relationship between capitalism and democracy is delicate and complex, and the former faces problems if its own behaviour threatens the latter. This happens because economic wealth can be converted into political power, and vice versa, leading to a self-reinforcing spiral of increasing economic and political inequality. First, the formal equality of universal suffrage is compromised when there is gross inequality in informal political lobbying. Second, the diversity of points of power necessary to pluralism is weakened when a small number of wealthy interests have influence over a wide range of issues.

## **9.6 Social Contract**

Social progress depends on the relationship between the economy and the polity. For most countries in the world – especially since the 1980s – this involves capitalism which generates the necessary surplus resources and democracy which determines (to some extent) their distribution. This relationship has always been contentious, but an important element reducing this tension has been the underlying existence of a social contract, a mutually acceptable understanding concerning the fair distribution of the costs and benefits of living together in the same society.

This contract may be explicitly bargained by representatives of capital and labor in corporatist arrangements or it may be implicitly accepted by individual actors and ratified by their electoral choices in pluralist ones. After World War II, in the developed world of Western Europe, North America and Austral Pacific, a number of factors combined to produce enduring social contracts and, hence, an exceptional increase in social progress. The war itself and the task of post-war reconstruction created an unusual public awareness of the benefits of solidarity among competing groups; continuous economic growth and the surplus it generated provided a greater margin for the re-distribution of benefits; social democratic and labor parties participated in or occupied the highest ranks of political power; trade unions increased their respective memberships and forged alliances with left parties, cooperatives and other civil society organizations; large-scale industrial plants depended critically on the compliance and productivity of their workers; and – perhaps most

importantly – the existence of the Soviet Union and the revolutionary threat it embodied and promoted encouraged privileged social and economic elites to compromise with subordinate workers, employees and their dependents.

From the 1980s to the present, not a single one of these favourable factors has prevailed and, not surprisingly, social regress has become more common than social progress almost everywhere in the developed world. At best, the decline has been moderated by so-called “concession-bargaining.” Even in those developing countries in Latin America, Africa and Asia that made a transition to democracy during this period; this did not result in an immediate improvement in social equality or living standards for their newly enfranchised citizens. A few exceptions aside – Brazil, Venezuela, (any others?) -- most of the world’s populations are living in more unequal societies than be

## **9.7 Social Movements and the crisis of responsibility in late neo-liberalism**

Social movements have long been considered as children of affluent times—or at least of times of opening opportunities. Already research on the labour movement expected strikes to develop when unemployment was low, or at least when economic crisis was accompanied by an opening of political opportunities (as, e.g., in the New Deal in the US). The protests against the Great Recession in the European periphery defy these expectations developing in moment of declining opportunities at both economic and political levels.

Social movement studies have indeed seen recent changes in the social structure as not particularly conducive to mobilization. In short, not only have processes such as deindustrialization and migration “weakened the structural preconditions that had facilitated the emergence of a class cleavage, particularly in the working-class model of collective action”, but recent developments have also jeopardized citizens’ rights through poverty, unemployment, and job insecurity. On the other hand, however concepts like Polanyi’s countermovements or Wallerstein’s anti-systemic movements point at the potential for contentious politics in times of deep grievances.

Anti-austerity protests also challenged the new social movement paradigm. While some research had indicated that the social bases of (left-wing) protest shifted from the industrial working class for the labour movement to the new middle classes for new social movements, anti-austerity protests brought attention back to the mobilization of the losers of globalization. Sometimes called ‘multitude’ or ‘precariat’, those who protested against austerity represented coalitions of various classes and social groups that perceived themselves as losers of neoliberal development and its crisis.

These various movements have to face a particular challenge in terms of the building of a collective identity. If neoliberalism produces a liquid culture, destroying old bases for personal, collective and political identity through forced mobility and related insecurity, identification processes are however neither impossible nor automatic. Rather, as social movement studies would predict, they assume once again a central role, which is however much shaped by the changing culture of neoliberalism. While the labour movement had developed a strong identity – supported by a complex ideology – and new social movements had a focus on specific concerns, the identification processes of anti-austerity protestors seemed to challenge the individualization of liquid society as well as its fear and exclusivism, calling instead for state intervention and inclusive citizenship. A strong morality framing grew to contrast the perceived amorality of neoliberalism and its ideology, with attempts to commodify public services.

Social movements active against austerity policies are embedded in a crisis of legitimacy that takes the particular form of a crisis of lack of responsibility towards citizens' demands. As the economic crisis was linked to a legitimacy crisis at the political level, "losers" felt such not only on the market, but also from the political point of view, as more and more groups in the society feel themselves non-represented within institutions that are more and more considered as captured by big business. While privatization, liberalization, and deregulation reduced the capacity of the state to answer citizens' demands, particularly those countries with weaker economies lost large portions of their national sovereignty, as they were forced to accept loans from international financial organizations, with attached conditionalities in terms of implementation of heavy austerity measures. Collusion between economic and political power then emerged more and more strongly. The effects have been a dramatic acceleration of trends toward declining party membership, loyalty, and identification as well as of conventional forms of participation and (especially) institutional trust. Activists stigmatize the power of big corporations and (unaccountable) international organizations, with the related loss of national governments' sovereignty. What is more, they hold responsible those governments and the political class at large for what they consider an abduction of democracy. However, rather than developing anti-democratic attitudes, they claim that representative democracy has been corrupted by the collusion of economic and political power, calling for participatory democracy and a general return to public concern with common goods. In this sense, these movements are not antipolitical but rather propose a different – deliberative and participatory – vision of democracy that they prefigure in their own organizational forms. Very successful in addressing the public and at times capable of sudden and dramatic political effects, these protests have been based upon new strategies with however still uncertain capacity for organizational resilience and the stabilization of collective identities.

## 9.8 The Territorial Dimension

The territorial nation-state has long been seen as the basis for political order. It imposes a spatial grid to define the boundaries of society, economy, identity and political community, and to underpin political institutions. Given the difficulty of 'exit' on the part of social and economic actors, it sustains social compromises, while shared affective identities underpin solidarity. The nation-state has also formed the basis for the democracy, as the *demos* is cast as a national one and common nationality is seen to sustain the trust necessary for democratic institutions and alternation in government. Of course, this is only an ideal-type, seldom realized in practice but it does carry a strong normative appeal across the ideological spectrum.

At the end of the Cold War, an 'end of territory' thesis was briefly fashionable. This coincided with the 'globalization' trope and the 'end of history' argument. Much of the 'end of territory' literature actually referred to the loss of the monopoly of states in defining and bounding territory and a re-territorialization in new and complex ways. This the process of spatial rescaling (Keating, 2013) in which economic, social, political systems and identities migrate to new levels above, below and across states. This is sometimes presented as the inexorable result of functional change but is in fact a deeply political and contested process. Social forces are differentially refracted at various territorial scales and rescaling disjoins policy spheres across spatial scales and redraws the boundaries of policy systems so as to include and exclude particular actors and social forces. The nation is also redefined as other communities are endowed with normative force and identities reconfigure.

One vision of rescaling is neo-liberal and involves the promotion of inter-territorial competition in pursuit of a 'race to the bottom' in taxation and regulatory standards. Another is driven by the search to reconstruct political community and solidarity at new scales. A third concerns the efforts of states to recapture and regulate systems that have escaped their control, whether through Europeanization or regional devolution.

A parallel trend is to the depoliticization of key policy spheres and their assignment to *ad hoc* institutions beyond political control. In some cases, functions are both rescaled territorially and assigned to non-elected institutions, as with the European Central Bank or regional and local development agencies taken out of political control.

Depoliticization strategies are almost invariably challenged as policy decisions create winners and losers. Rescaling thus becomes a matter for political contestation. Contestation takes place over the boundaries of new spaces, over their meaning (whether as spaces for economic competition or social solidarity) and over their institutionalization. It is futile to hope for a return to the mythical nation-state as the best form to confront economic power and sustain solidarity. Indeed, there has always been something paradoxical in progressive forces defending the nation-state, which is intrinsically partial and was rarely constructed by and for progressive forces. It is equally mistaken, as in traditional theories of federalism, to insist that welfare and redistributive issues can only be addressed at the 'highest' level. The failure of solidarity within the European Union is evidence of this and, even within states, it is not always the highest level that is the most solidaristic.

There is no stable territorial fix, or 'optimal' distribution of competences. Concepts like multilevel governance lack a firm ontological or normative foundation and have been appropriated by power-holders (including states, the European Commission and international agencies) as a part of a strategy of depoliticization and to suggest a smooth process of adjustment without distributive politics or social conflict getting in the way. A more politicized conception of territory is needed. Questions of democracy and solidarity questions must be posed at all levels and within all spheres.

## 9.9 Policing and dissent

Democracy is an unfinished project — a 'work in progress'. The processes of democracy can be rolled back and they can be rolled forward. While it is important to understand the health and resilience of the basic institutions of liberal representative democracies, it is just as necessary to understand the public spaces for dissent, given that *a central and basic paradox of democracy is between conflict and consensus*.

Democracy implies *dissent and division*, but on a basis of consent and cohesion. It requires that the citizens assert themselves, but also that they accept the government's authority. It demands that the citizens care about politics, but not too much (Diamond 1990, p. 56).

In order to retain its legitimacy liberal democracies are committed to allow dissent. The public spaces for assembly and freedom of speech are essential elements in democracies and these spaces of contention, according to liberal constitutions, must be protected. The conundrum lies in that while domestic dissent must be allowed, governments are determined to steer this dissent in ways that do not fundamentally threaten the political and economic order. The spaces for the maneuverer of political

challengers must be protected without jeopardising the rule of law. Demonstration rights must be made secure but political violence on the part of challengers, e.g. terrorist attacks on refugee centres, etc., must be rigorously policed. In other words, institutional actors meet the perceived threats of oppositional forces with actions designed to ‘steer the conduct of civil society’ (Loader 2000: 344) so as not to threaten or disrupt the dominant political and economic order. Repression or policing contention is a dispersed mechanism *for* the governance of the dominant political and economic order. Dissent *is* governed, by sheer coercive force or by less strong-arm and subtle means, in order to maintain the status quo (Peterson and Wahlström 2015).

Policing contention is typically thought of as exercised at the national scale, and in many cases this is correct in terms of the steering, that is, law-making and coordination of repressive capacities. However, since 11 September 2001 the US-defined ‘war on terror’ has dramatically extended the geopolitical scope of the governance of dissent to the global scale and with this extension clouded the traditional distinction between domestic threat and foreign threats. Post-September 11 has witnessed an unparalleled international cooperation and intelligence sharing between police authorities and security services and private corporate intelligence agencies in this new situation for the governance of dissent.

In response to terrorist actions or the threat of terrorist actions numerous democracies across the globe enacted anti-terrorist acts, such as the Patriot Act in the US and the Prevention of Terrorism Act in India, which have radically expanded the repressive powers of the federal government thereby infringing on civil rights of assembly and protest (Abdolian & Takooshian 2002; Cole 2003). Abdolian & Takooshian point out that ‘historically, during times of crisis, it has been natural for democratic nations, including the United States, to temporarily abridge individual liberties in ways that would never be considered in more halcyon times’ (p. 1446). The rule of law, in Agamben’s (2005) understanding, becomes lawless. For example, the USA Patriot Act of October 2001 dramatically reduced restrictions on law enforcement agencies’ capability to search telephone and e-mail communications, medical, financial, and other records. The act expanded the definition of terrorism to include what the Act defined as domestic terrorism, thus enlarging the number of activities to which the Patriot Act’s extended law enforcement powers could be applied. For example, animal rights organisations and ecological organisations could fall within its reach making it potentially a ‘felony to, among other things, “deter” the business activities of industries engaged in the exploitation of animals and natural resources by protesting the actions of a corporation or influencing a unit of government to take a specific action’ (Eddy 2005: 262). These changes in the statutes have, according to Eddy, boosted the governance capacities in some states to protect economic interests and threaten to significantly raise the costs of involvement in nonviolent environmental protest.

Moreover, in the aftermath of terrorist acts as in Paris 13 November 2015 the French government declared a ‘state of emergency’ through which the government extended the decree and temporarily suspended democratic rights of assembly, banning the protests, marches and other outdoor activities planned by climate change activists across the globe as a counter-voice, or alternative ‘civil society’ to the official meeting of COP21 elite representatives. The French authorities in essence announced their disregard to provide security for peaceful demonstrators, rather they prioritized the security of the

world leaders assembled for the Climate Summit, shoppers and soccer fans.<sup>1</sup> The threat of terrorism, and its concomitant states of emergency, effectively disengages democratic rights of dissent within civil society.

Furthermore, policing theorists have warned that democratic societies have progressively shifted towards becoming ‘surveillance societies’ where ‘surveillance displaces crime control for the efficient production of knowledge useful in the administration of suspect populations’ (Ericson 1994, p. 139), thereby more and more and effectually extending in liberal democracies the legal scope of repression away from respect for the constitutionally protected rights of individuals to encompass collectives of individuals. For example, since 9/11 and further accelerated in face of the threat posed by ISIL (Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant), Security Services are increasingly targeting Muslim communities as suspect populations. By casting a wide net in their counterterrorism measures, Security Services have introduced a ‘religious profiling’, which in effect risks criminalizing Muslims *per se* (Peterson 2012). Counterterrorism policing in many Western European countries now gives priority to what are called preventive strategies in which cooperation with Muslim communities is sought by the Security Service. According to Peterson (2012), in Sweden the ‘soft coercion’ of the Security Service is an attempt to create new spaces of governance, where Muslim communities (and individuals) are ostensibly ‘invited’ to participate in the State’s counterterrorism programme. These invited spaces reflect what Raco (2003: 78) describes as the State’s ‘increased concern with defining and shaping “appropriate” individual and community conduct, regulation and control’, which in effect extends the scope of repression from political dissidents to targeted communities and away from the constitutionally protected rights of individuals, which is a cornerstone in the rule of law in liberal democracies.

Political actors — both social movements and political parties — are found on the far-left, the left, the moderate right, and the far-right of the political spectrum, that is, not all political actors are benign nor democratically progressive. We have in addition *the basic democratic paradox of majoritarian rule* in liberal democracies in which majorities can suppress minorities and with the support of an electoral majority the processes of democracy can be turned back or even overturned; for example, the current case of Hungary, as well as the uncertain political trajectory of Poland after the recent 2015 autumn elections.

In the wake of the fiscal crisis in 2008 and the waves of refugees seeking entry into Europe far-right extremist movements and far-right parties are mobilizing the ‘losers’ in ever increasing numbers across Europe. Democracies, through an ordinary ‘free and fair’ election, can take a turn away from the rule of law. In Hungary 2010 Viktor Orbán’s Fidesz Party won 53% of the vote and a seat bonus big enough to give it powers of constitutional amendment, moving toward what Orbán himself has called an ‘electoral revolution’. The speed and the scale of the changes have indeed been revolutionary. The new 2011 Constitution and its enabling acts have turned what are supposed to be politically neutral bodies such as the Constitutional Court, the Central Bank, and the offices of the Ombudsman and the Public Prosecutor into arms of the ruling party. In short, according to Rupnik (2012, p. 133), ‘Orbán and his lieutenants have downgraded or done away with the checks and balances that are widely considered essential for the rule of law’. If you add to this an act that creates a

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<sup>1</sup> The official ban was temporally lifted for the public demonstrations on the last day of the Summit 12 December 2015.



state agency meant to ensure ‘media objectivity’, thereby undermining the public space for critical opposition, you have the main ingredients of an authoritarian drift in the governance of dissent. While the developments in Hungary are perhaps the most dramatic these movements and parties have found varying traction within civil societies and among electorates across Europe. In Sweden the neo-Nazi movement party, the Sweden Democrats, have been so successful in their make-over that in the 2014 elections they garnered over 12, 86% of the vote to become Sweden’s third largest party (Peterson 2015).

Events, whether these are terrorist attacks or the perceived threat of terrorism, fiscal crises, or a refugee crisis, demonstrate the fragility of democratic processes in so-called new democracies as well as in consolidated democracies. Democratic processes can be rolled back. The developments, mentioned above, provide substance to Giorgio Agamben’s (1998 and 2005) portentous warning that we have entered a ‘permanent state of exception; ‘the state of exception has become a paradigm of government today’ (Agamben & Raulff 2004, p. 609). The existence of derogation-like clauses permits states to suspend the protection of certain basic human and civil rights thereby undermining meaningful political action. Declaring war on the terror the Bush administration invoked a *global state of emergency* to wage infinite war on an indefinite enemy. The present ‘permanent state of exception’ should, Agamben indicates, be understood as ‘a fiction sustained through military metaphor to justify recourse to extensive government powers’ (p. 610), which can be introduced to cope with political dissent more generally — we see increasingly the conjunction of sovereign power and the police in the governance of dissent in contemporary democracies. In short, democracy is under siege, and from a number of fronts.

## **Chapter 10. Violence, wars, peace, security**

### **Narrative:**

- Contradicting global trends and major challenges
- Peace and/or justice
- Recognition, representation, redistribution (peace quality)
- Rethinking security and peacebuilding

### **Structure of the chapter:**

#### **10.1 Introduction**

- Rationale, structure
- Understanding of social progress (related to negative/positive peace; peace - justice)
- Method, level-of-analysis
- Time frame
- Definitions

#### **10.2 Global trends and patterns**

- Violence/conflict/war
  - Intrastate conflict
  - Interstate conflict
  - Internationalised internal conflict
  - One-sided violence and non-state actors
  - Terrorism
  - Criminal violence
  - Sexual and gender-based violence
- Preventing/managing/building peace
  - Disarmament, arms control and non-proliferation
  - Peacekeeping
  - Protection
  - Peace negotiation and agreements
  - Peacebuilding
- Challenges ahead: positive/negative/blurred trends

#### **10.3 Topics**

- Social, political, cultural, gender inclusion/exclusion (representation/recognition/redistribution, peace quality)
- Radicalisation and extremism
- Security-equality-development nexus
- State capacity and legitimacy



- Regime types and peace
- Geopolitics and power re-configurations
- Global governance and international institutions
- Rethinking security (migration, human security, human rights, protection)
- Rethinking peacebuilding (international-local)

#### **10.4 Conclusion**

- Opportunities and obstacles (new threats)
- Conditional prescriptions (policy-recommendations)

## **Chapter 11. Supranational organisations and technologies of governance**

### **Narrative:**

This chapter will argue that supranational organizations (SOs) and the transnational technologies of governance they employ are arenas of power and contestation. They have served as ongoing forms of domination reflecting asymmetries of public and private power. Yet they have also served as vehicles for social progress. The challenge is to build on the latter to constrain the former, notably those asymmetries associated with forms of colonialism and hegemony.

The chapter will develop a broad definition of SOs, including not only interstate organizations such as the United Nations, but also civil society organisations and informal supranational networks. It will take a similarly broad approach to identifying technologies of governance. These include traditional mechanisms such as law-making through treaties and judicial and arbitral decision-making, as well as “soft law” mechanisms, for example the development of codes of conduct and public-private arrangements such as the Global Compact. Technologies of governance to be addressed in the chapter will also include the way that informal networks are galvanized, such as AIDs activism in the 1990s.

SOs have made significant steps in the achievement of social progress. One example in the area of human rights is the development of sophisticated global and regional standards and norms and various types of institutions to monitor them. Bodies such as the International Criminal Court provide new forms of accountability for egregious criminal behaviour. However, SOs have been constrained in their contributions to social progress by a range of factors, including politicised decision-making structures, the possibility of capture of organizations by particular interest groups, resistance by powerful states to monitoring processes, asymmetries in decision-making capacity between the developed and developing world.

The capacities and limitations of SOs will be studied through the seven case studies. These have been selected to reflect a range of topics and levels of success in promoting social progress. The considerable literature on the working of SOs will then be surveyed and measured against the findings from the case studies. We will conclude with proposals for ways to achieve social progress through SOs, using as one example the development organisation BRAC in Bangladesh to illustrate ways forward.

### **Structure of the chapter:**

#### **11.1 What are supranational organizations?**

We shall consider supranational organizations to embrace any kind of social organization that crosses state boundaries in order to influence social progress, whether or not they do so in fact. One class of supranational organizations are homologous with state-created institutions: regional, transnational and global legislatures (e.g., European Parliament, UN General Assembly), international courts (e.g., International Criminal Court, European Court of Justice, Andean Courts), and international regulatory institutions and inter-governmental organizations (e.g., IMF role in financial monitoring and surveillance, IATA, development banks). Another class are homologous with civil society organizations within states: international NGOs, including interest groups, religious bodies, political party alliances; international informal but stable networks of organizations or individuals; universities and educational institutions. Yet another class are market organizations: industry and professional associations; multi-national business firms; informal and formal financial and investment institutions; labor organizations; management and investor networks. In practice, these classes of supranational organizations interpenetrate and overlap in public-private partnerships, in IOs that incorporate both state and non-states in their decision-making and implementation, in networks that integrate state and non-actors in common causes, in international epistemic communities of service professionals, scientists and academics, among others.

## **11.2 What are technologies of governance? [note connections/possible overlaps here with Chapter 12]**

Legal technologies of governance developed by lawmaking supranational organizations include multi-lateral conventions, model laws, legislative guides, guides to practice, model contracts, standards and codes, and best practices. Governance technologies also include various formal and informal accountability processes, involving formal courts, administrative-like bodies (including networks of national officials and private associations), and decentralized certification processes, including informal reporting and assessment in light of hard and soft law norms. They are transnational and apply in multiple directions both to nation-state governance and local practices, and to supranational organizations themselves. A rapidly increasing technology of governance relies on indicators. These vary from rigorous criteria deployed by international financial institutions (e.g., World Bank and IMF Reports on the Observance of Standards and Codes in 12 areas of financial regulation) to criteria developed by non-profit organizations to rate countries and corporations on human rights, rule of law, freedom, and justice, among others. Moreover, peer review practices increasingly are being applied to global governance (e.g., OECD regional peer meetings).

## **11.3 Case studies**

### **Health**

Intergovernmental cooperation in health began in the late 1800s as a measure to balance the imperatives of trade vs border protection for health, leading eventually to the establishment of the World Health Organization in 1948. The larger landscape of health development has become increasingly crowded and fragmented, shifting from missionaries and a few major

philanthropies in the early 20th century to a multiplicity of bilateral donors, development banks, large private philanthropies, and international NGOs by the late 20th century. Despite rise of modern medicine and eradication of some infectious diseases, the issues of global concern have become more complex. The advent of increased industrialization, urbanisation, population mobility, and climate change has seen societies, particularly in less developed countries, battling the triple burden of disease (i.e. emerging diseases, non-communicable diseases, and health inequalities related to social and environmental change). The solutions are contested in various supranational fora – between focused and targeted approach to financing and disease eradication and strategies focused on universal access and participation. These tensions reflect political, ideological, and economic contexts, with a general reluctance to adopt legal instruments for governance (the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control and International Health Regulations are the only two). The future of global health governance is thus highly fluid, with Sustainable Development Goals offering a potential focus for coordination and partnerships.

### **Human rights**

These are paradoxical times for human rights in general, and for human rights SOs in particular. On the one hand, human rights have achieved an unparalleled status as a global discourse on social progress, and have been institutionalized through a wide range of organizations at the global, regional and domestic levels. On the other hand, they are the focus of growing criticisms regarding their limited effectiveness, Northern-centrism, and outdated institutional architecture and strategies at time of increasing geopolitical multi-polarity, regulatory fragmentation, and technological change. Drawing on evidence from different issue areas – from civil and political rights to socio-economic rights to disability rights to emerging fields like business and human rights and the environment and human rights – our chapter will outline the key institutional, legal and political challenges and the alternatives to tackle them, so as to reinvigorate the contribution of human rights to social progress.

### **Refugees and migration**

The Global Migration Regime is in crisis as reflected, among other things, in the non-entrée regime against asylum seekers/refugees and the growing number of deaths of migrants attempting to cross borders. According to IOM over 2,000 migrants have died in the Mediterranean alone trying to reach Europe in 2015. A key question that needs to be addressed is the criteria to be used for evaluating the Global Migration Regime? Should it be assessed on the basis of a rights based approach rooted in the idea of human dignity? If so how does such an approach accommodate the concerns of migrant and refugee hosting countries? Another issue relates to the relationship between the normative architecture in the field of forced and voluntary migration and the design and functioning of institutions such as UNHCR and IOM? To what extent does the former constrain the effective functioning of refugee and migration organizations?

## **WELFARE OF REFUGEES: SOME QUESTIONS**

1. What are the problems that asylum seekers/refugees confront in seeking refuge and actualizing rights that are contained in the 1951 UN Convention on the Status of Refugees? There are at least two sets of problems that asylum seekers/refugees confront. First, there is the non-entrée regime that faces asylum seekers who seek refuge in the Global North. There is a host of diplomatic, legal, and administrative measures put in place to prevent asylum seekers from seeking refuge in the Global North. Second, there is the highly inadequate rights regime in countries both of the Global North and Global South. What steps can be taken in this regard, including creating new mechanisms of oversight, by concerned supranational organizations?
2. Why have major refugee hosting countries not ratified the 1951 UN Convention on the Status of Refugees? These include Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, Indonesia, Malaysia, Nepal, Pakistan, and Thailand. Further, why have most Asian countries not ratified the Convention on the Status of Refugees? Among those States in the Global South that have ratified the Refugee Convention, why have very few enacted domestic legislation to implement treaty obligations.
3. What is the role the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) played in refugee status determination (RSD)? In countries where UNHCR carries out individual status determination why are the procedural standards applied lower than those that it declares that States should follow?
4. To what extent does the voluntary funding of UNHCR, most of it from donor nations, impose a serious constraint on its policies and functioning?
5. In what ways do regional organizations such as African Union (AU) or legal aid networks or NGOs complement the role of UNHCR in providing assistance and protection to refugees?

## **WELFARE OF MIGRANTS: SOME QUESTIONS**

6. What explains the rise of immigration controls in the last century? These controls contrast with the liberalization of regimes for the flow of goods, capital and services?
7. Why is there no place for a legal right to freedom of movement across borders in ever expanding international human rights law?
8. What is the relationship between migration and development? Does greater migration promote development of poorer nations? What is the historical evidence in this regard?
9. In what ways do relevant international conventions promote and protect the rights of migrants? Why are host states unwilling to ratify the important 1990 UN

Convention on the protection of the Rights of all Migrant Workers and Members of their Families?

**10.** What are the problems and risks that confront migrants? How can IOM and other intergovernmental and nongovernmental organizations alleviate these problems and risks?

Do we need a new World Migration Organization, as proposed by the economist Jagdish Bhagwati, to scrutinize national migration policies?

### **Women's rights**

Campaigners for women's rights have often resorted to the international arena. International institutions have appeared to offer hospitable and progressive sites to protect women's rights in the face of often hostile national environments. While there have been a number of important developments in international protection of women's rights, supranational organisations have also been ambivalent on this topic. This case study will, first, describe the international architecture that relates to the protection of women's rights. It will then identify the two major themes in this area -- that women require special protection, and that women have a right to equality -- and the tensions between them. It will conclude by assessing the work of supranational organisations in this field.

### **Intellectual property**

This case study will consist of three subsections. The first will address the history and development of the organizational architecture of international IP, including actors, ideas, and processes and their connection to the exercise of power and resistance. It will highlight the innovative and pathological aspects of supranational organizations, how they have been used strategically to instantiate and resist global forces (including in the domain of human rights); and how they interface with other bodies of international and domestic law, as well as institutions and social movements. The second section will address three case studies that illuminate different facets of how global IP connects to human rights, cultural heritage, trade law, and access to knowledge. These case studies are 1) pharmaceutical patents and access to medicines; 2) copyright and ownership of information/knowledge exceptions; and 3) IP and traditional knowledge. Finally the study will consider different strategies for change.

### **Climate change**

One of the most pressing global challenges of this era is human-induced climate change. In fact, the risks posed by it are so dramatic that it is rather shocking that so little has been done in order to effectively address it. Given its nature, climate change can only be fought against through international cooperation and supranational organizations but, after a promising start -- when it came to diagnosing the problem-- current transnational technologies of governance appear to be ill-prepared to address this issue.

Of course, much of the problem lies in the fact that an effective policy against human-induced climate change would necessarily require drastic transformations in the modes of production and consumption that most societies aspire to have. Having said this, the role that international

cooperation and supranational organizations can have in articulating an adequate global response to this issue is critical. Thus, the need to re-think the transnational technologies of governance that currently deal with this problem.

### **Conflict, security, and terrorism**

A wide variety of supranational organizations have engaged in multilateral governance of crises, threats and disturbances to the peace or stability since, at least, the late 19th century. Issues of prevention, de-escalation, peacekeeping, peace-making, enforcement, stabilization, local administration and development, conciliation and adjudication have been practiced to serve security and to contain conflict, violence, and, in particular, to eradicate terrorism. Since 2005, the UN Peacebuilding Committee has made efforts to bring co-ordination to the fragmented field. Yet, certain patterns of governance technologies and their use, the successes and failures can be identified. The case study on conflict, security and terrorism will discuss them generally and in reference to particular governance efforts by SOs.

## **11.4 Achievements of SOs in terms of social progress [ to be developed at March 2016 meeting, but including: ]**

- Development of sophisticated global standards/norms to deal with social problems
- Broad state participation; creation of mechanisms to help keep states accountable to each other and to each other's citizens in light of transnational effects of national decisions; development of independent third party forums of dispute settlement
- Broadening of accountability (e.g. ICC)
- Development of innovative strategies (e.g. social inclusion in Alma Alta Declaration)

## **11.5 Problems of SOs in terms of social progress [to be developed at March 2016 meeting, but including: ]**

- Decision-making processes of SOs
- Lack of coverage of major areas (e.g. climate change)
- Limited accountability (i.e. some actors escape accountability (such as multinational corporations))
- Patchy implementation of standards (problems of translation of international standards to national and local levels)
- Resistance by states (e.g. US, China on human rights)
- Possibility of capture by interest groups
- Judicialisation of politics
- North/South asymmetries [e.g. representation, ideas]
- Elite/grassroots asymmetries
- Radical social justice concepts are blunted in organisational practice

## **11.6 Assessment of techniques identified to increase the contribution of SOs to social progress**

This section will be a survey of proposals in the social science literature to achieve social progress through SOs, identifying consensus and debates and research gaps. E.g:

- Development of more and better law and normative standards
- Voluntary standards (e.g. Global Compact)
- Development of accountability measures
- Deployment of concepts such as rule of law
- New governance ideas – experimentation and feedback between the supranational and national and local
- Interstate/regional cooperation – subsidiarity?

## **11.7 How to achieve social progress through SOs [to be developed at March 2016 meeting with the exception of BRAC case study (to be drafted by 15 Feb 2016)]**

- BRAC in Bangladesh as a model?  
With particular reference to the experience and critical acclaim of BRAC as a global best practice example, this case study will examine innovative technologies of governance at the core of salient civil society initiatives in the global south to bolster social progress. Probing what political economy, histories and narratives shape instructive civil society dynamics and patterns, the study will illuminate the promise that inhere in strategies which have evolved from grassroots commitments to cope with the proliferating challenges and constraints attributed to the fragility and failure of state institutions in the epoch of global interdependence. This is with a view to enrich understandings about the conditions, opportunities and challenges for local agency to enhance the infrastructure for meaningful domesticating and realizing shared values epitomized by the international human rights regime, especially in the post-MDG epoch.
- Drivers for and barriers to change: e.g. development of a transnational public sphere that links civil society across nations (e.g. AIDS activism in the 1990s; landmines treaty)



## **Chapter 12. Varieties of global governance: institutional and distributional effects of globalization**

### **Narrative:**

1. Changes in governance associated with the globalization of economic activities and financial flows are an essential aspect of globalization itself
2. These changes are multi-faceted, and here, we reject universal narratives that focus exclusively on the move from multilateral regulation of economic globalization in the Bretton-Woods era to the networked and informal governance of the post-1970s
3. In contrast, we seek to elaborate a typology of governance arrangements, and we have so far identified 4 different arrangements, which have affected differently various fields like trade, IP, social policy, macro-economic governance, etc.
4. The assumption we make is that these governance arrangements raise specific problems, challenges and promises, which explains why we focus on modes of governance rather than themes/fields (like trade, social policy, etc.)
5. Among these 4 arrangements that we have so far identified, the literature has heavily focused on the first two, but less on the ways governance has worked by either purposefully excluding topics from the realm of things that should be governed at the global level (or by creating organizations that lack resources), or by letting institutions that were governing certain aspects of economic globalization (especially social policies) decay.
6. We include these last 2 governance arrangements, which are particularly salient to economic globalization but which, however, are not governed globally, because we want to problematize how the exclusion of issues (like social policy or labor protection) from the global field of governance is produced by the main players in charge of global governance. We reject the “perspective from above” which consists in excluding institutions from the scholarly inquiry just because they are neglected or relegated by powerful players.
7. In our future work, we will have to pay deep analytical attention to the now provisional categories that we have identified so far to distinguish between governance arrangements (like “neglect”, which can take more or less institutionalized forms), and we might end up with more categories.
8. For each governance arrangement, we will ask what are the main obstacles raised to the
  - greater inclusion/participation of the main stakeholders (accountability)
  - greater efficacy/capacity to realize the desired outcomes without endangering other aspects of social lives (efficiency)
  - more just and equal distribution of the benefits and risks of economic and financial globalization (distributive justice)

as well as to the specific ways by which such obstacles could be raised in the future

## **Structure of the chapter:**

### **12.1 Introduction**

- Start with illustrative examples of ‘grand narratives’ provided about the changes brought by economic/financial globalization to global governance arrangements in a variety of fields (trade, finance, social policy, labor)
- Problematize the issue and present the perspective from which we speak, e.g. a “*comprehensive perspective*” on global governance that extends to the governance (even by neglect) of socio-economic aspects of globalization vs. a “*perspective from above*” which would only focus on trade and finance

### **12.2 Typology of governance arrangements**

- Present the criteria we use to distinguish governance arrangements
- Present the normative questions we ask about each governance arrangement – such concepts will include (but will not be restricted to): accountability (transparency and inclusiveness), efficiency (efficacy and side effects, negative or positive), distributive justice (equality and empowerment)
- Present succinctly our assumptions about the specific problems and obstacles raised by each governance arrangement in terms of accountability, efficiency, distributive justice and other criteria

### **12.3 Governance through multilateral, regional & bilateral arrangements**

- Accountability:
  - Reflections on the notion of “consent” when it is extracted from the poorer nations in the context of treaty-based multilateral/bilateral negotiations ☐ transparency and unequal participation in formalizing/writing of standards
- Efficiency:
  - Reflections on the side-effects (unintended or intended) of diverse trade and IP agreements and treaties
- Equality/empowerment
  - Reflections on main obstacles to empowerment and possible “bright lights” we see emerging in the form of contestations, reformulations, etc.

### **12.4 Governance through norms and expertise**

- Accountability:
  - Reflections on the “privatization” and/or “informalization” of governance structures in the form of international associations, epistemic communities, etc.: how they raise issues regarding inclusiveness of alternative voices (pluralism) and public sharing of information
- Efficiency:

- Reflections on the “tunnel vision” and “group think” which excludes side-effects from the assessment of policies
- Equality/empowerment
  - Reflections on main obstacles to empowerment and possible “bright lights” we see emerging in the form of citizen participation (World Social forum), counter-expertise

## **12.5 Governance through de-regulation & purposeful issue-exclusion**

- Accountability:
  - Reflections on purposeful issue-exclusion as marginalization/exclusion of stakeholders from participatory process; on production of ‘doubt’ and fake pluralist debate as a way to exclude issues from expert consensus or inter-state negotiations
- Efficiency:
  - Reflections on the moving boundary between “policy targets” and “side effects”, and how the boundary can be instrumentalized to exclude issues (naturalize them) from impact assessments
- Equality/empowerment
  - Reflections on main obstacles to empowerment and possible “bright lights” we see emerging in the struggles to ‘raise awareness’, change the agenda, etc.

## **12.6 Governance through neglect**

- Accountability:
  - Reflections on various forms of neglect, like incorporated prejudice (Bourdieu’s notion of habitus) vs. institutionalized neglect (like letting existing IOs decay in the face of everyone); and how these various forms of neglect relate to issues of stakeholder exclusion and topic-marginalization
- Efficiency:
  - Reflections on how the invisibility of consequences is associated with “invisibility” of categories targeted
- Equality/empowerment
  - Reflections on main obstacles to empowerment and possible “bright lights” we see emerging from attempts to change the diversity (ethnic, gender, etc.) of regulators, and whether it percolates on the content of policies

## **12.7 Conclusion: problems affecting each governance arrangement and presentation of alternatives**

- Summary of the specific problems affecting each governance arrangement and specific solutions
- Evaluation of existing policy proposals of reform (affecting WTO, EU, etc.) in light with our evaluation of the main problems and specific solutions that could be brought

## **Chapter 13. Media and communications**

### **Narrative:**

- Broad definition of media to include traditional media/telecomms and digital platforms, networks and data
- Social justice in media and communications = fairer access to the resources and competences for voice and participation in collective self-determination
- These resources and competences are technological, institutional and cultural
- Media afford spaces for encounters and indifference, solidarity and antagonism, normalization and contestation, open always to multiple appropriations
- Long uneven history of evolving structures of communication that enable multiple spaces of exchange (for politics, economy, society, culture) on and across all scales
- Communications infrastructures expand capitalism (state and corporate power), enable counter-movements for social justice, and facilitate their cooptation
- Implications of the new connective infrastructure of the internet, digital media, and data industries (access, agency, governance, surveillance, economic justice)

### **Structure of the chapter:**

#### **13.1 Introduction: media infrastructures and communication flows**

- Media's role in supporting 'modern' forms of national economy, government, society, and citizenship ('media' as infrastructures of connection)
- Media forms as enablers of increasing (global/transnational) cultural complexity
- The question of 'social justice' in relation to media and communications as fairer access to resources and competences for voice and participation

#### **13.2 Media industries from print to the internet**

- emergence of traditional media institutions as infrastructures of connection
- the unevenness of previous point across the world from 19th to 21st centuries
- the internet as an unprecedented linked space for connection, expression *and* commercialization & the accompanied new forms of inequality and surveillance

#### **13.3 Media infrastructures as developing aspect of governance**

- the evolving relations between media infrastructures and regulation/secrecy/governance
- from formal governance to informal governance (& from national to global/transnational?)
- the ambiguous implications of such media-based governance for social progress

### **13.4 Changing media connectivity and communicative citizenship**

- historic connections between media (as infrastructures of connection) and spaces of citizenship (local, national, regional, translocal, global?)
- resources for participation and citizenship always technological, institutional *and* cultural
- the challenges of globalization: new exclusions
- new forms of ‘communicative citizenship’ [Ingrid’s case from Australia?]
- implications of previous point for excluded groups [case studies: disability?]

### **13.5 Media and public knowledge**

- journalism as a form of public knowledge for democracy (social progress)
- new forms of digital & citizen journalism [case study here?]
- the economic threat to journalism’s viability
- information literacy in the digital age

### **13.6 Media infrastructures, data flows and resulting new justice issues**

- media infrastructures and data infrastructures
- new concentrations of power via the data infrastructure and counter-struggles [case study: Brazil’s *Netmondial*]
- normative implications of data infrastructure: for liberty, autonomy, justice

### **13.7 New forms of mediated encounter and awareness**

- [Case studies: new mediated encounters/awareness: eg Zhao’s Chinese village? & case studies of cosmopolitanism and self-reflexivity?]
- Too much information and too intimate connectivity: the risk of indifference and echo-chambers?

### **13.8 New forms of mediated dialogue and solidarity**

- [Case studies of new mediated dialogue and solidarity]
- Too much mutual exposure: the risk of enmity without common ground?

### **13.9 Media and communications as sites of struggle over social justice**

- [Case studies of media-based struggles over social justice and social progress such as interaction “old media” and “new media” in contemporary social movements; technology design driven by corporate interests and activists’ creativity to re-purpose technologies; digital technologies and surveillance of activism]

### **13.10 Summary and recommendations**

- 10.1 A triple movement: infrastructures of connection *expand* capitalism, *enable* counter-movements, *facilitate* counter-movements’ cooptation
- 10.2 Media and communications infrastructures as *themselves* a site of struggle for social progress (because uneven relations to media and communications infrastructures are themselves a dimension of social justice – see 1.3 above)
- Relation of the above to SDGs (and other normative frameworks)
- Recommendations

## **Chapter 14. Perspectives for democracy and equality**

### **Narrative :**

- Democracy is suffering different forms of exclusion and failures of accountability.
- We explore some these core challenges particularly globalization, disenchantment, social exclusion, and religious diversity.
- Democracies are able to respond to these challenges. In particular the increasing socio-economic inequality seems to constrain these democratic responses.
- Up to now it is not clear which democratic innovations can revitalize democracy and to which extent they may generate new, unintended challenges to democracy.

### **Structure of the chapter:**

#### **14.1 Defining Democracy**

Why and when is it appropriate for citizens to have an equal say in decision making? Does social progress necessarily mean more democracy?

#### **14.2 The Spread of Democracy**

How far has democracy spread both to include more countries (widening) and more areas of political and social life (deepening)? If such spreading is uneven, and if it has not always been accompanied by greater equality between citizens, what are the consequences of such unequal democracy?

### ***Challenges***

#### **14.3 The Challenge of Inclusion and Exclusion**

Who should be included (and who excluded) as a political equal in any given democratic decision, and how can such inclusion be achieved so as to ensure political equality?

#### **14.4 The Challenge of Religious Diversity**

Religious Diversity – Is religion special? Has it created particular difficult forms of political inequality?

#### **14.5 The Challenge of Globalisation (Financial Markets, Free Trade and Neo liberalism, Immigration)**

In what ways do these developments impact on political equality?

#### **14.6 The Challenge of Disenchantment with Democracy**

Does democracy matter? Has democracy failed to deliver on its promise? Is continuing inequality the reason?

#### **14.7 The Challenge of Gender Equality**

#### *New forms of Democracy*

#### **14. 8. Democracy Below, Beyond and Across the State? Equality between Citizens or States?**

#### **14.9. Rethinking Democracy Outside the Ballot Box I: OECD-world**

#### **14.10. Rethinking Democracy Outside the Ballot Box II: Global South II**

#### **14.11. Democratising the Capitalist Economy**

## **PART III – TRANSFORMATIONS IN VALUES, NORMS, CULTURES**

### **Chapter 15. Social progress and cultural change**

#### **Narrative:**

Any project of social progress is likely to involve significant cultural change, transforming people's identities, aspirations, loyalties, horizons, perceptual and cognitive regimes, norms and values. Drawing on the example of modernization theory in the postwar period, we discuss some common pitfalls in the ways in which processes of cultural change are perceived and understood. We focus on two issues that are of particular relevance to the IPSP: the need to nurture an ethos of solidarity and citizenship; and the need to address risks of cultural exclusions and stigmatization. Although these issues were acknowledged within modernization theory, it lacked the tools to analyze them, and to address them today requires a more sophisticated understanding of the politics of cultural inclusion and exclusion. This requires both a refinement of our general theoretical concepts, and also a comparative and historically nuanced perspective on culture that takes into account regional differences, asymmetric developments and social specificities.

#### **Structure of the chapter:**

##### **15.1: The uses and abuses of culture talk**

We begin the chapter by noting that we live in an era marked by “culture talk”. We define “culture” broadly, to refer not only to “the arts” or so-called high-and-low culture, but to culture in the anthropological sense of the everyday social norms, ideas and identities that define the meaningfulness of social interactions of individuals and societies. Culture in this broad sense is invoked for political purposes in a bewildering array of contexts. In some contexts, it is used to justify claims for the legal recognition or political protection of particular practices, on the grounds that these are “essential” to a group's culture. In other contexts, it is used to explain inequalities between groups or societies, as when people say that Roma poverty is due to their ‘culture’, or that failed democratization in Arab countries is due to Arab/Islamic culture. In all of these contexts, and further heightened by the invocation of the “return of religion”, culture appears as an essentialized and fixed imperative, tied to a specific bounded and clearly identifiable group, ignoring the reality that cultures are always evolving, contested and interacting as social practices, and that individuals can and do take a critical perspective, explicitly



and implicitly, towards cultural inheritances. In response to these problems, some commentators have proposed that we abandon “culture talk”, both in academic analysis and public discourse.<sup>2</sup> But this is neither feasible nor desirable. Human beings are not only social beings, as the IPSP emphasizes, but also cultural beings. We are meaning-making beings, who evaluate options (including visions of social progress) by how they fit into our “cultural scripts” and “collective imaginaries”, and whether they recognize and respect our collective identities, loyalties, and sense of belonging. Struggles for social and political change are therefore also cultural contestations. Recent manifestations of political protest (for example the Arab Spring, Pussy riot, Iranian protest culture, etc) partake, in their own ways, in “culture talk”, marked by the conscious use of forms of cultural representation to articulate new visions of life and social engagement.<sup>3</sup> We need to find a way constructively to engage with these cultural frames, and we ignore them at our peril, as we will see in the case of modernization theory.

### 15.2: The modernization paradigm of cultural change

In the postwar era, particularly from the 1950s to 1970s, most social scientists, and most international organizations, defined social progress through the lens of “modernization theory”. According to this theory, modernization is characterized by a series of social processes – such as education, literacy, urbanization, legal codification, gender equality and bureaucratization – which dis-embedded people from their traditional ways of life. People no longer simply inherited ascribed roles and relationships within a traditional culture, but are exposed to different ways of life, and (to varying degrees) have options for the kind of person they want to be, and the kind of life they want to lead. The inevitable result, according to modernization theory, is a kind of *individualization*. People’s horizons were no longer bound to a particular tribe or village, and this in turn leads at an individual level to the privileging of individually-chosen goals over ascribed group norms, and at the political level to the privileging of civic identities over primordial ethnic or religious identities. As modernization proceeds, individuals come to orient themselves politically towards modern public institutions, and to define themselves as citizens of the society as a whole. Viewed this way, modernization theory is not just about particular social reforms, such as urbanization or bureaucratization, but is also fundamentally about cultural change: about creating new kinds of individual subjectivities, with new values of individual choice and civic

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<sup>2</sup> Eg Aziz Alazmeh, *Islams and Modernities* (Verso 1994), Aijaz Ahmad, *In theory* (Verso, 1992) Mahmood Mamdani, *Beyond rights talk and culture talk* (St Martin’s Press, 2000); Kwame Anthony Appiah, *The ethics of identity* (Princeton, 2005); Amartya Sen, *Identity and violence* (2007).

<sup>3</sup> On cultural representations as the means to articulate visions of social engagement, see the foundational works of Georg Simmel, Pierre Bourdieu or Raymond Williams.

commitment. Modernization theory sought to create the very autonomous individuals and civic-minded citizens who in turn would sustain and support modernizing public institutions. This picture of how social reform generates cultural change is now widely seen as naïve, but it was for many years the dominant image of social progress, and it continues to cast a long shadow, and requires us to adopt a more nuanced approach. The dialectics and tensions between ‘modern’ and ‘traditional’ unfold differently within and across societies, depending on gender, age, class, race and other social locations, in ways that have profound effects for social progress. So it is worth pausing to consider what precisely is wrong with the modernization paradigm of cultural change, and what lessons we can learn from it. In the rest of the chapter, we focus on two key lessons, about civic responsibility and cultural exclusion.

### 15.3: Individualization as promoter and inhibitor of social justice and progress

Central to modernization theory’s understanding of cultural change is the notion of individualization. As noted earlier, modernization is assumed to *dis-embed* people from their primordial communities and traditional ways of life, thereby creating autonomous individuals, and then to *re-embed* these autonomous individuals in modern civic societies with a new ethos of solidarity based on shared citizenship. However, modernization theory focused much more on the dis-embedding than on the re-embedding, and lacked a clear account of how to nurture an ethos of solidarity amongst autonomous individuals. It therefore left open the possibility of a more radical kind of individualization, in which dis-embedded individuals are not re-embedded, but instead become narrowly egoistic or narcissistic, indifferent to the fate of their fellow citizens. Rather than becoming civic-minded, they might instead become “possessive individualists”, and rather than identifying as citizens, they might instead identify as consumers.<sup>4</sup> This anxiety about the rise of egoism and consumerism is of course a long-standing complaint of both conservatives and radicals, to be found in most societies undergoing modernizing change, although conservatives are more likely to blame the ideology of liberalism or secular humanism, whereas radicals blame the ideology of capitalism. It is important to emphasize that individualization is not inherently inconsistent with social solidarity or civic-mindedness. Indeed, the evidence suggests that the “individualism-collectivism dimension is unrelated to the egoism-civiness

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<sup>4</sup> And in response to such developments, some radical particularists of a sectarian or ethnic nature (e.g. Hizballah, Evangelist movements) have offered alternative forms of re-embeddedness that disconnect followers from state-based forms of belonging and solidarity.

dimension”.<sup>5</sup> Indeed, some countries with high levels of individualization (as measured, for example, by support for rights to dissent and to choice and to self-expression) are amongst the most solidaristic (as measured by redistribution). There is, in short, such a thing as “solidaristic individualism” which involves a robust ethos and practice of citizenship. However, it is equally clear that there is nothing in the process of individualization that *guarantees* such solidarity. Whether modern individuals see themselves as belonging to a community of shared fate, and as embracing an ethos of citizenship and mutual obligation, depends on a number of factors, including national narratives, collective imaginaries, cultural scripts of belonging - in short, on cultural work. Modernization theory offers no guidance on how this sort of cultural work to build civic-mindedness and solidarity can and should be done.

#### **15.4 [3b?]: From market economy to market society: the cultural implications**

While individualization is not inherently inconsistent with civic mindedness and solidarity, the prospects for combining the two are arguably more difficult today than in the heyday of modernization, due to the influence of neoliberalism. The economic and political dimensions of neoliberalism are described in other chapters, but we would emphasize their cultural implications – i.e., how the spread of neoliberalism has not only changed the distribution of economic resources and political power, but also changed the shared ethos in society, and its narratives of membership and belonging.<sup>6</sup> Modernization theory typically operated with a vision of “embedded liberalism” – it embraced the need for markets, but assumed that markets had to be embedded in (and regulated by) a larger social context that was not itself founded on market norms.<sup>7</sup> With the rise of neoliberalism, however, a certain kind of “market fundamentalism” has emerged, not only in the sense of extending the role of markets (eg., through privatization and deregulation), which has changed the everyday metabolism of social life, but also in the sense that even non-market domains are reconceived using market metaphors and concepts (eg., as matters of investment, productivity, reciprocal exchange, contract, etc). Commentators have sometimes described this as a shift “from a

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<sup>5</sup> Bo Rothstein, “Solidarity, Diversity and the Quality of Government”, forthcoming in *The Political Sources of Solidarity in Diverse Societies*, edited by Keith Banting and Will Kymlicka (Oxford University Press); Christian Welzel, “How Selfish Are Self-Expression Values? A Civicness Test.” *Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology* 41/2 (2010):152-74.

<sup>6</sup> For reflections on this, see *Social Resilience in the Neoliberal Era*, edited by Peter Hall and Michèle Lamont (Cambridge University Press, 2013).

<sup>7</sup> See John Ruggie on embedded liberalism; Karl Polanyi on the need to embed markets in society.

market economy to a market society”, in which market norms have come to characterize ever-wider domains of society, at the expense of norms of civic responsibility.<sup>8</sup> While it would be unfair to blame modernization theory for these pathologies of neoliberalism, it is equally true that modernization theory’s indifference to the cultural sources of solidarity left the door open for this sort of market fundamentalism.

### **15.5: The Politics of primordial identities - emancipatory or regressive**

Modernization theory was equally mistaken in its prediction regarding the decline of “primordial” or “ascriptive” group identities. Ethnic and religious identities today are as politically salient as ever before, albeit with significant variations within and across societies. Modernization has radically transformed traditional ways of life, but as Barth noted, groups often retain a strong sense of identity and a strong desire to act collectively, despite, or indeed because of, radical changes in the content of their ways of life.<sup>9</sup> Modernization theorists tended to decry this phenomenon, and to dismiss it as backward, futile, uncivil, and as an obstacle to social progress. In reality, political mobilizations along lines of race, ethnicity, religion or indigeneity are sometimes struggles against exclusionary features of the dominant conceptions of social progress. Modernization theorists typically assumed that the “public institutions” and “civic identities” they were defending were accessible to all. But we know that these institutions and identities are almost always marked by various cultural hierarchies, valorizing certain groups as advanced, civilized and responsible, while denigrating others as backward and unruly. Social progress was presented by these institutions as the natural outcome of the history, language and culture of certain groups, while the language, history and culture of other groups were presented as obstacles to progress. In order to participate in ‘public’ and ‘civic’ life, members of these stigmatized groups are required to hide or suppress their distinct identities, and to constantly address prejudices about their worth and belonging. Even when the institutional rules do not formally discriminate on a racial or religious basis, they still may reproduce these hierarchies of status and recognition. Insofar as mobilization around subaltern group identities is intended to challenge these (implicit or explicit) hierarchies, they may be seen, not as evidence of uncivil sectarianism and tribalism, or as a futile rejection of cultural change or cultural influences, but as struggles for more inclusive and effective forms of democracy, citizenship and social progress. Of course, this is not to deny that uncivil sectarianism and tribalism also exists, but the challenge is precisely how to differentiate the more emancipatory from the more regressive forms of ‘primordial’ politics. In the past few decades we have seen many examples of how similar-sounding

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<sup>8</sup> Michael Sandel. See also Debra Satz; Anne Phillips; Margaret Somers.

<sup>9</sup> Barth, *Ethnic Groups and Boundaries* (1969).

claims to particularist rights has led, based on different political strategies, to divergent if not entirely opposite outcomes. Because of its knee-jerk dismissal of all such identity politics, modernization theory leaves us unable to either understand, or constructively respond to, the reality of, and indeed the modernity of, identity group politics.

### 15.6: New spatial dynamics of culture

So far, we have identified two key lessons from the modernization era regarding the cultural dimensions of social progress: the need to attend to the cultural sources of civility and solidarity, and the need to attend to the risks of cultural exclusion and the ambivalent politics it generates. We believe these two lessons from the post-war era remain valid today. But of course circumstances have changed, and we confront new challenges arising from the changing relationship of culture, space and globalization. We will highlight two important implications of these changes since the postwar modernization era that complicate the task of addressing the cultural dimensions of social progress. First, in the modernization era, it was assumed that both the cultural sources of solidarity, and the risks of cultural exclusion, operated at the national level. Each nation-state formed its own bounded container within which modernization would take place. Today, however, we know that these cultural resources and risks were not and are not nationally bounded. (Other chapters will discuss the flaws of “methodological nationalism” in relation to economics and politics: here again, our focus will be on its flaws in relation to culture). As a result of the transnational flows of people in the form of forced or free migration, symbolic and material goods, and the advances of modern communication technologies, the relevant cultural frameworks people deploy to make sense of social progress operate at multiple levels, locally, nationally and transnationally, and globally. There emerge as well new forms of social solidarity which transform older notions of universal unity (workers movements, the umma, Catholic church, global artists and academics). The result, we would argue, is not to replace nationally-bounded solidarities with unbounded cosmopolitanism, but rather the development of new forms of “rooted” or “vernacular” cosmopolitanism,<sup>10</sup> which link very local and particular attachments to broader spatial dynamics of representation, reflexivity and agency, transforming our ideas of both the local and the global in the process. As examples of the transformative dimension of these spatial dynamics, one could think of youth cultures or global protest movements. They link themselves to far distant localities, using new cultural modes of expression, participation and

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<sup>10</sup> Appiah, *Cosmopolitanism: Ethics in a World of Strangers* (Norton, 2007). See also “anchored cosmopolitanism” (Dallmayr 2003), “situated cosmopolitanism” (Baynes 2007), “embedded cosmopolitanism” (Erskine 2008), “vernacular cosmopolitanism” (Werbner 2006). These ideas have been challenged for underestimating class and racial disparities in the ability to form or access such linkages.

representation, thereby overcoming spatial distance while seeking to re-define the public space, locally and globally. As compared to the old model of nation-states as bounded containers, the cultural dynamics of such rooted cosmopolitanism create both challenges and opportunities for the building of inclusive solidarities.

### **15.7: Multiple modernities?**

A second fundamental change since the era of modernization is the recognition of “multiple modernities”.<sup>11</sup> Modernization does not necessarily lead societies to convergence on particular economic or political forms (such as secular liberal-democracies), but rather can take very different forms, including more religious (as in Muslim modernities) and/or more authoritarian (as in Singapore). Of course even in the era of modernization there was a profound clash between capitalist and communist conceptions of modernization. But both sides during the Cold War shared the assumption that modernization would displace traditional religious and cultural frameworks: the idea of an “Islamic” or “Confucian” modernity was as inconceivable to Soviet as to Western modernizers. The idea of multiple modernities is controversial. Some critics argue that, while seeming to recognize the validity of non-Western conceptions of modernity, talk of multiple modernities in fact allows Western states to evade the post-colonial critique of Western modernity. It acknowledges other modernities, but does not acknowledge the need to question the West’s own modernity. Other critics have the opposite fear that talk of multiple modernities allows authoritarian states in Asia and Africa to evade internal critique and dissent of their rule. In our view, the idea of multiple modernities can be useful, not if it operates to evade critique, but on the contrary if it helps clarify the normative stakes in evaluating different models of social progress. And one part of this evaluation, we would suggest, is precisely respect for the cultural dimensions of social justice and flourishing. Various forms of modernity may well achieve economic growth and political stability, but whether they can recognize and respect cultural diversity and create an inclusive sense of belonging is less clear. In that sense, addressing the issues of cultural resources and cultural risks that we’ve identified in this chapter is essential, not just to develop a more adequate and complete conception of social progress, but also to justify the endorsing of particular models of modernity.

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<sup>11</sup> Eisenstadt, Shmuel Noah. “Multiple modernities” *Daedalus* (2000): 1-29.

## **Chapter 16. Religious communities, ideas and practices**

### **Narrative:**

Ninety percent of the world's people subscribe to some sort of "religion." And religion itself is constantly being transformed as people live it (for example Pentecostalism in the Global South and beyond and new spiritualities in the Global North and elsewhere). Thus it is self-evident that social progress is impossible if we ignore religion. This does not mean viewing religion as an impediment to progress—as has been the tendency of scholars and social scientists for generations—but it does mean exploring the ways in which religions contain possibilities both for good and for ill. Our task, then, is to bring to bear the best social science research on the conditions and circumstances under which religion contributes to or impedes social progress.

### **Structure of the chapter:**

#### **16.1 Scope and definition:**

- What do we mean by "religions" and how are these related to secularities?
- What do we mean by social progress?

#### **16.2 Managing diversity regarding:**

- The movement of people
  - The increase of diversity in some places (e.g. Muslim immigration into the West); and decreasing diversity in others (e.g. flight of Christians from the Arab world)
- Technologies and patterns of connection and separation (bringing diverse worldviews into contact and potentially into conflict).
- The responses of states and the law to these issues

#### **16.3 Peace and conflict**

- Micro-level (domestically and locally, non-state activities – noting that this overlaps with 2b above)
- Macro-level (states and international relations, territory and identity)



### **16.4 Power, participation, and political structures**

- Religious institutions as a space for the development of “civic skills”
- Religious movements for democracy
- Religious movements as impediment to democracy – why and how?

### **16.5 Economic well-being and social welfare**

- Religious communities as service providers – taking into account their critical role in situations of weak states, but acknowledging the arguments about whether the state should be the sole actor.
- Health and education – access to skills/ transformations of the labour market and the workplace

### **16.6 Family, gender, and sexuality/equality issues**

- Women as reformers and innovators
- Religious authorities and traditions as impediments – why and how?

### **16.7 Creating and protecting spaces that allow moral discourse, connection to sacred imagination and a larger sense of humanity and the earth**

- The earth itself
- Specific buildings and sacred places
- Threats and possibilities, including climate change

### **16.8 Conclusion**

A very careful conclusion that recaps what we have done, reflects carefully on this and suggests a way forward in terms of social progress.

### **Links with other chapters/ overlap/ and cross-cutting issues**



1. We see a clear link with Chapter 15 (ex 14) that we would like to pursue. It can be articulated thus: our colleagues in this chapter indicate that they will problematize modernization (and its effects on cultural change); we in turn problematize its bedfellow secularization, a point to develop further.
2. We do not see any serious issue of overlap with other chapters. That said – and whilst we understand the need to avoid repetition – it is important not to isolate religion from wider changes. In our view, a number of other chapters could (indeed should) make more reference to religion as one among other sources of diversity and change. We, conversely, will be looking for ways to integrate diversity issues as seen in the round (see Section 6 above).
3. We were grateful to be part of **all** the cross-cut sessions provided in Istanbul and will take careful note of what was said. Migration is clearly a crucial issue for us (see Section 1 above) as is a proper understanding of human flourishing (see below)..

### **An important question**

Central to our chapter is a clear grasp of social progress, understanding this in broader terms than economic or political advancement. We require such a definition as a framework for our argument.

In Istanbul, we approached this in terms of human flourishing which would include the following elements:

- A healthy and sustainable relationship with the natural environment
- A place/territory of belonging and identity that is secure, yet open; and the ability to know and trust those who are our neighbors
- Economic well-being that assures survival and more
- Political ‘voice’ and representation
- Equality and fair treatment that doesn’t discriminate based on gender, sexual orientation, religion, or ethnicity
- Opportunities to seek and engage a spiritual dimension in life that makes the following possible: transcendence of the human condition; a sense of meaning and purpose; and the ability to discern moral direction
- Spaces and connections in which to explore possibilities for change

We wondered whether this might also be helpful for other chapters, especially those in Part III.

## Chapter 17. The pluralization of families

### Narrative:

- urgent issues under these themes:
  - Diversity of families and legal recognition
  - Overwork, underwork, informality, poverty and inequality
  - Care deficit, burden of unpaid work on women, varied role of fathers
  - Intersection of gender and socioeconomic inequalities
- Normative question: how can conditions be fostered that allow families to flourish while assuring the dignity/rights of individuals
  - laws and policies that promote gender equity, social equity and individual autonomy
  - dignity and rights of children, dependents

### Structure of the chapter:

#### 17.1. Pluralization of families

##### A. Conceptual definition of family:

- Define the boundaries of the family as a unit
- Family/household as a basic economic unit of society/central unit of consumption (and of production in LDCs/often a unit of income pooling, consumption sharing)
- Family as a generator of meaning, culture and inequalities/Where core decisions are made regarding well-being of individuals/Rules governing the division of labor associated with individual & household welfare
- Family as a mechanism that legitimates certain values, norms, and behavior, and not others. Norms of reciprocity and obedience. The community, state, markets, non-state institutions (eg religious authorities) structure, influence and mediate the family, and in turn the family may mediate (some of) those entities eg the family as a significant 'political' unit/actor as well as economic one. -also, the dark side of the family, can also exert pressure and can dominate, be violent etc.

-Family is not a stable thing—think of family as a set of processes and dynamics and relationships. Family may generate impacts—but it is also shaped by and regulated by state and market forces.

Working statement: “The family is an institution central to individual wellbeing and to vigorous societies because of the caretaking, human development, and affiliation that families support. Yet the family can also serve to generate socioeconomic and other forms of inequality both within its structures and externally. The extent to which families support wellbeing, caretaking, and human development without generating inequality is profoundly affected by the interaction of families and other societal institutions, including the market, as well as by cultural values and norms.”

Our normative goal: How to generate conditions that allow families to flourish while at the same time promoting individual autonomy and dignity and gender equality?

-Related concern: the goal of gender and social equality/equity (controversies about latter term) both within the family and between families.

## B. Social changes.

-Tremendous changes in the past decades, globally but with regional specificities.

-Outline trends in family composition and reproduction, and education and labor force participation and the family.

### Fertility and family composition:

-urbanization, varied decline in fertility rates both internationally and across income quintiles (eg the only countries where lower income quintiles do not have higher fertility rates are the Nordic and some continental European countries)

-decline of extended family units, rise of nuclear family (eg in India, urbanizing areas of MENA)

-rise in female-headed households and (increasing) absence of resident fathers (eg particularly acute in South Africa, rising everywhere)- -rise in unipersonal households

-the rise in family stability in developed countries (increase in marriage rate and fall in divorce rates) but phenomenon among middle and high income groups mainly. Creates polarization of family structures, which affect men, women and children in various ways. (Low-income) men may have problems finding partners and to sustain family ties, and

women's and children's economic foundation may be fragile (refer to multi-country studies here)

- rise in 'waithood', postponing marriage till later ages because of economic pressures

- increase in transnational families (not just between developed and developing countries, but also within regions and developing countries)

### Division of paid and unpaid labor and the family

- increased schooling world-wide, narrowing (or elimination) of gender gaps in primary schooling

- Rise of working women and mothers, stratified across countries and income quintiles (eg. In Latin America class gap between women in highest and lowest income quintile is similar to the gender gap between women and men in the lowest quintile)

- Women's increased labor force participation associated with both decrease in fertility & rising education, as well as economic crisis of the 1980s (Latin America) and decline of "family wage" (both developed & ldc's)

- take into account historicity of this—women have been in the workforce for thousands of years—it was only specific periods and classes in which women (as mothers) were not part of the workforce

- changing gender roles in unpaid labor; mothers, fathers, lots of variation

- the erosion of the 'patriarchal' family; Increase in women's labor force participation & access to resources giving sway to the 'egalitarian' household, where joint HH decision-making the norm

- urbanization, mobility, transnationalism, eg. the dynamics of the transnational family and the emotional tolls in such household formation

### C. Changes in values and norms

- changing religious norms (there is another chapter dealing specifically with religions so we can cross-reference that)

- changes and persistence in gender roles, notions of motherhood, fatherhood and childhood; increased acceptance of changed roles of women, values of gender equality, lagging cultural changes in roles of men and fathers in terms of caregiving

-changes in ideal family size (micro level) draw on ISPP survey family module which was done in 2002 and 2012 in ca. 33 countries to show changes in norms and perceptions

#### D. Changes in laws that define families

-backdrop of tremendous variation across countries and regions

-definitions: what can legally constitute a family, eg. Biological parents and children; non-biological parents; same-sex families; extended families; polygamous families

-regulating authorities: state vs customary laws –strong role of religious/tribal authorities on this issue

-religious institutions and the family: cover issues such as “Islamic family law” and “Muslim personal status law” or “Islamic normativity”, in MENA but also re other Muslim majority states and Muslim communities/similar (historical) analysis for other major religions, especially Christianity

“the changes in family roles required by changing social and economic change may act to illuminate the inadequacy (and/or lack of justice) of existing legal orders endorsed by the state and/or religious authorities etc”

### **17.2 The state and the family**

A) Laws and regulations regarding family obligations and rights of individuals within the family: -Marital regimes & inheritance regimes govern how property/authority is distributed within families, between men and women (trends: eg. in separation of property marital regimes, move towards recognizing married women’s non-labor market contributions in case of separation & divorce/move towards gender equality in inheritance by children)

-parents’/guardians’ and children’s rights; laws on child support; laws regulating family interventions/punishing parental behavior (eg in the US taking a kid away from a mom who works at McDonalds and has her kid play alone in a playground etc)

-Parenting policies and the difference from family policy (and cross-regional variation) i.e. parenting policies as a way to regulate parenting and the raising of the child. Two rationales: Improving parental competence, and increasing parental engagement with the development of their children (Need for focus on adolescent children who are often forgotten, much more than just the wild teenager)

-Policies on violence within the family

-Policies on sexuality and the family

B) State policies regulating the interaction between families and states, markets, and non-state institutions (eg religious organizations)

-transfers and services: how they do/do not reinforce certain kinds of family; influence labor market participation of mothers and fathers; influence the sexual division of labor in the family; have an impact on the extent of unpaid care work in the family

### **17.3 Economy and the family**

#### Issues/themes:

-modes of production and their relation to the family

-work, employment, unemployment (also overlap with transition into adulthood), formal/informal work, wage gap, and the family

-occupational segregation and the family (include paid domestic work here)

- Intra-household bargaining; eg. how women's increased access to resources (wage and other income, assets, mobility) is increasing their bargaining power, changing household decision-making and its impact on child welfare; impact on women's autonomy

-globalization of economy, transnationalism, migration

### **17.4. Reproduction/life course and the family**

#### Issues

- sexual and generational division of labor within the family; time use studies, exemplifying men and women's roles in the family

-care of dependents: children, disabled and the elderly within and outside the family (e.g. the increasing gender equality in caring for children (in some contexts))

-the commodification of reproductive labor (crosses into economy and state section as well)

-demographic changes and the family (fertility rates, ageing societies)

Families and transmissions of inequalities (Intergenerational inequalities, social investment policies)

#### Trends:

-aging and the family in many societies, on the one hand; child-headed families eg in African countries ravaged by the AIDS crisis, on the other hand

-new reproductive technologies and their impact on gender issues (new trends in reproductive politics – decreasing fertility as a sustainability issue; assistive reproduction tech (ART))

- Reconstruction of responsibilities – social investment, responsabilisation, universalism/selectivism in welfare support. Intergenerational – active ageing, postponement of pension
- Need for focus on adolescent children who are often forgotten
- rise of divorce and (more in the west?) of people living alone

### **17.5 Intimate relations**

Definition of intimate relations: “Intimate relations can be non-sexual and/or sexual; they exist in marriage, non-marriage or non-marriage-type relations, friendships, and self-selecting cultural groups, for example, in schools and workplaces; they can be proximal but can also be virtual and across great distances, especially in digital worlds. Care, which we deal with, is key in intimate relations, but violence is not uncommon. Thus intimate relations include family relations, sexual and socio-sexual relations; relations of friendship, care and caring, social support and neighborliness; and relations of interpersonal violence, violation and abuse from known persons (i.e. not strangers, in impersonal military conflicts, etc.). These intimate relations can be, and are probably increasingly, non-local, as for many migrants and transmigrants, and even virtual, as in online intimate relations. This latter point is especially important for younger generations, but is also becoming gradually more significant for older generations too. This applies to both positive (e.g. friendly) and negative (violating) intimate relations. What are initially positive (sexual, friendly or caring) relations can clearly become negative and violating in some, even many, cases. In some social contexts this is normal and normalized.”

- isolation, loneliness, belonging

### **17.6. Conclusion**

## **Chapter 18. Global health and the changing contours of human life**

### **Narrative:**

Population-scale trends in human health, fertility, technology, and social organization will strongly affect how individuals experience the major events and concerns of human life: coming into being, having children, the experience of health, disease, disability, and death itself. The global direction of change in longevity and healthy life expectancy is, for the most part, strongly positive; but disparities and social challenges remain.

For a number of these major life concerns, we describe recent changes, project their future course and distribution (with particular emphasis on inequalities), and examine and assess the reciprocal effects of these changes in the texture of living on prevailing values on which we rely to guide future policy and conduct and on the institutions upon which we rely to realize these norms.

### **Structure of the chapter:**

#### **18.1 Coming into being: Differences in health and life prospects**

- Child survival and development
- Perinatal health and development;
- Maternal health & Barker hypothesis;
- Congenital malformations?
- Genetic selection and manipulation
- Sex selection

#### **18.2 Longevity: Living longer**

- Trends in LE and mortality (3 mo/yr trend for now; upper limit unknown)
- Disparities (within and between nations)
- Impact on environment, economy etc of increased “old old”
- Scaling up: changing conceptions of what one does at what age; what can be adjusted (e.g. retirement age) and what cannot (e.g. age of menopause)
- New dilemmas in generational relationships
- What people can do to live longer



### 18.3 Disability and Chronic Conditions, physical and mental

- “physical” and “mental”
- Definitions: “disability” as (i) any health problem or deficit (b) condition interfering with everyday activities; (c) disabling condition creating dependency
- Trends: higher healthy life expectancy; perhaps more years living with disability; epidemiological transition
- Modes of care: family, institutional; concentration of the burden
- Disparities (within and between nations)
- Disabling vs enabling social institutions and accommodations; stigma
- What people can do to avoid disability
  - Individuals vs the “nanny state”
  - Genuine choice?
  - “Commercial targeting”: tobacco, sugar, etc.
- Mental Health
  - Trends in mental health: increasing prevalence? Diagnosis? Attribution of share of burden of disease?
  - Responses to mental health needs: pharmaceutical, institutional/deinstitutional, social accommodation
- Enhancement

### 18.4 Reproduction:

- Wanted and unwanted fertility: Choosing the number and timing of children
- Controlling and influencing fertility: pro-natalist policies
- Policing of reproduction: abortion, forced sterilization;
- means of reproduction; de-coupling of sex and reproduction; access to reproductive technologies and to birth control
- reproduction and family structure (coordinate with Ch. 17 ex 16)
- maternal health and health care (beneficial and harmful practices)

### 18.5 Dying

- Definitions: the life/death boundary becomes fainter
- Death that just happens vs death that is intended vs death due to risk
- Stopping treatment; palliation
  - [In relation to expectations and beliefs in life after death]
- Visibility and Invisibility of death:
  - Ubiquity or rarity of death
  - Circumstances of death (hospital vs home)
- Choosing to die; euthanasia

## Chapter 19. How can education promote social progress?

### **Narrative:**

Goals/aims/purposes of education.

1. Economic: education develops skills to participate in the labor market and workforce.
2. Civic: education develops civic capacities to participate in political institutions.
3. Humanistic: education develops the fullest array of human talents and interests.

Each of these goals can be understood from an individual and collective perspective.

Relationship between education and justice:

1. Justice demands that all individuals be afforded (equal?) educational opportunities.
2. The provision of educational opportunity to all, across all three goals, is necessary for social progress and the advancement of justice but not sufficient. This includes access to education, experiences within it, and outcome from it.

Current conditions:

- Educational opportunity is not everywhere provided to all.
- Educational policies weight the economic purpose with comparatively little attention paid to the civic and humanistic aims.

What are the facilitators and barriers to education as a means to social progress?

- Governance of Education
- Transitions
- Content and Pedagogy
- Values and Attitudes

How can the barriers be transformed to become facilitators to the realization of the three goals of education?

### **Structure of the chapter:**

#### **18.1: Introduction**

How can education promote equity and social justice?

To answer this question, we must first distinguish among three distinct goals/aims/purposes of education.

1. Economic: education develops skills to participate in the labor market and workforce.
2. Civic: education develops civic capacities to participate in political institutions.
3. Humanistic: education develops the fullest array of human talents and interests.

Each of these goals can be understood from an *individual* and *collective* perspective. Education develops economic skills, and this is valuable for the individual (to advance in the labor market) and for the society (to compete in a globalized economy)

Education develops civic skills, and this is valuable for the individual (to participate in civil society and political life) and for the society (to have an informed and engaged citizenry).

Education develops human talents and interests, and this is valuable for the individual (because activating human capacities is central to human flourishing) and for the society or humanity (because knowledge and human achievement is valuable for its own sake).

Overall, education is about the unleashing of human capabilities: economic capabilities, civic capabilities, and humanistic capabilities. When education is successful, it enables individuals not merely to exercise their agency in participating in economic, civic, and humanistic activity but also to shape or re-shape economic, civic, and humanistic life. Education for economic skill development not merely prepares people for the workforce; it shapes the labor market itself. Education for citizenship not merely prepares individuals to participate in civic life; it enables social movements that shape political institutions. Education for human talents not merely develops the vast domain of human potential; it advances humanity's storehouse of knowledge and cultural achievement.

When we think about the relationship between education and justice, we reach two additional conclusions.

First, justice demands that all individuals be afforded (equal?) educational opportunities. Second, the provision of educational opportunity to all, across all three goals, is essential to social progress and the advancement of justice. This includes access to education, experiences within it, and outcomes from it.

Transition to next section:

When we observe education across the world today, we notice two things. First, educational opportunity is not everywhere provided to all. Second, educational policies weight the economic purpose with comparatively little attention paid to the civic and humanistic aims.

## **18.2: Current Landscape of Education**

What is the condition of education today?

1. Unequal opportunity; in some countries, all children entitled to access educational opportunity, in other countries, not so. In every country, wide gaps in educational attainment and outcomes.

2. Great body of evidence that connects educational attainment and higher achievement to increased earnings and economic competitiveness. Helps explain policy focus on economic purpose of education.
3. National versus global (relates to a tension in the very ideal of justice: social justice or global justice?)
4. Academic versus Vocational

### **18.3: Facilitators and Barriers to Education as a Means to Social Progress**

#### **A Governance of Education**

- Marketization and multiple stakeholders (e.g delivery mechanisms for educational opportunity; what are the funders and providers?; growing impact of technology)
- Governance by Numbers (educational assessments)
- Autonomy and Centralization

#### **B Transitions**

- within educational system
- from education to labor market (economic goal of education)
- from education to civil society and civic participation (civic goal of education)
- lifelong learning (all three goals)

#### **C. Content and Pedagogy**

- Education for transmission of particular identities: religious, ethnocultural, gender, national.
- Learner centered education
- Growing impact of technology
- core curriculum for the 21<sup>st</sup> century

#### **D Values and Attitudes**

--How to Implement and Sustain Reforms

--education for reproduction or transformation?

General Q: how to make these features into facilitators rather than barriers to the realization of the three goals of education? We solve everything in the conclusion!

## **18.4: Recommendations**

Examples or case studies (should be collected by writing the sections – using SLACK)

Recommendations

## **Chapter 20. Belonging and solidarity**

### **Narrative:**

Solidarity is shown among human subjects when they participate in movements and struggles for an ideal. By comparison, 'belonging' is a property of a much more general and eventual kind, without any such restriction to movements and struggles. We can strive to higher forms of belonging. And when we do, we achieve social progress. We'll review the relatively recent rise of interest in the notion of 'identity' in the social sciences. Belonging as a social ideal lies on deeper ground in some ways than the other great ideals of politics of the last few centuries: the ideals of liberty, equality and redistributive social justice. We will consider in detail the quite different felt social phenomenologies of belonging to a majority and a minority in a nation's public arena, as well as the issue of belonging to nature, as its inhabitants. We will conclude by producing five regional case studies in which the analytical and theoretical points made so far will be tested and refined in their empirical application.

### **Structure of the chapter:**

#### **20.1 Defining and distinguishing concepts**

Our Outline will begin by declaring a stipulation --that we will restrict our use of the term 'solidarity' to stand for a property, a relational property, of movements and struggles. Solidarity is shown among human subjects when they participate in movements and struggles for an ideal. By comparison, 'belonging' is a property of a much more general and eventual kind, without any such restriction to movements and struggles. Thus one belongs to a society, a nation, a race, a gender, a caste, a fraternity, ...We then (roughly) define some cognates of the term 'belonging' which we will be considering at one or other point in the outline: 'identity', 'community', 'inclusion', 'recognition', 'fraternity'.

#### **20.2 Belonging as an Ideal of Social Progress**

The next section argues that belonging as an ideal, being a normative property, is an improvable condition of human beings. We can strive to higher forms of belonging. And when we do, we achieve one kind of social progress, the theme of this International panel. And one criterion of improvement is the widening of the inclusiveness of what we belong to --from, say, the thought that 'I belong to my tribe' to, as Terence put it, "Nothing human is alien to me". There will be some detailed and specific grounds given to ensure that this widening of inclusiveness does not amount to thinning the notion of belonging out to the point of trivializing it. And much theoretical effort will go into a discussion of what this trajectory of improvement consists in, why it is considered to be improvement exactly, why it is a form of social progress, and how it relates to other forms of social progress being considered by the International Panel. In particular it will calibrate with some of the points made in the outline of Chapter 15.

### **20.3 Belonging, Identity, and Class**

There will be no avoiding the vexed, the longstanding, and the still unresolved question of how a variety of social identities we may possess relates to class identity. This section will begin with a survey of the relatively recent rise of interest in the notion of 'identity' in the social sciences. Identities such as those deriving from one's commitments to one's race, gender, language, caste, ethnicity, religion... became a subject of close study because of a feeling that standard liberal universalist philosophy and Left thinking had excluded these and their potential as sources for human belonging as well as their capacity to mobilize us in politics. Left politics, in particular, was considered to have done so by giving a higher priority to 'class identity' over these to the point of having virtually silenced or preempted them. Despite its familiarity, this entire controversy will be extensively explored and adjudicated, and we will not be shy to stick our necks out about the extent to which Left politics is or is not right in having done so, and to the extent that it is right, what exactly that priority should consist in. There is no avoiding this subject, no way to get clear on the nature of belonging as a human aspiration without being clear about it. These conclusions will no doubt square with the conclusions of other chapters –those, for instance, having to do with gender as well as those concerned with equality.

### **20.4 Beyond Social Engineering: The Wider Significance of Belonging**

The chapter will then argue at some length that belonging as a social ideal lies on deeper ground in some ways than the other great ideals of politics of the last few centuries: the ideals of liberty, equality and redistributive social justice. Deeper in the sense that were we to think of redistribution, for instance, as a resting point in our aspirations, and not as something that makes possible a sense of belonging that is unalienated and that enhances our human subjectivity, then redistribution would amount to mere social engineering. This point is not by any means to demean redistribution as an ideal nor social engineering which we consider to be a necessary instrumental exercise, but to deny them to be the ideal and methods we, as just said, rest with. This argument is intended to push further many of the excellent points developed in some other chapters that address questions of equality and social justice.

### **20.5 Belonging to a Majority, Belonging to a Minority**

Since the rise of numerical and statistical forms of discourse in the study of societies and polities, notions of majority and minority have governed a great deal of political analysis. This section will consider in detail the quite different felt social phenomenologies of belonging to a majority and a minority in a nation's public arena and the political mentalities generated by these differential senses of belonging. The phenomenon of belonging to a majority tends often to be less self-conscious than that of belonging to a minority, until and unless the majority is mobilized in a way that occurred mostly in nation-building exercises that came to be called 'nationalism' in Europe. As a general, though not exceptionless, rule, majoritarian belonging is often felt under conditions of triumphalism (eg. as Linda Colley points out that the Scots declared themselves as belonging to Britain once Britain became an Empire). Feelings of both identification and belonging (not by any means the same phenomena, and we will distinguish between them) to a minority is much more often self-consciously felt and asserted under conditions of helplessness and defeat and during mobilisations of resistance. One theme that we will also pursue in this section is what happens to one's sense of belonging to a majority when an

erstwhile subjugated majority gains power. South Africa and Bolivia are interesting contrasting examples, with Bolivia moving on from indigeneous identitarian issues to some extent in the pursuit of policies that sought to finesse the neo-liberal demands that came from the United States and other metropolitan centres of capital in a way that South Africa, especially under Mbeki, failed to do. As a result, such victories as the South African transformation of 1994 achieved would continue to be described to this day in merely identitarian terms, i.e., as an assertion of a victory for blacks. This opens a whole area of investigation about the relation between belonging and policies in the economic and political sphere.

## **20.6 Belonging in Nature: A Philosophical and Political analysis**

What is it to be at home in the world? Apart from belonging in the social sense discussed in the points above, there is a by no means unrelated form of belonging that we experience --belonging to nature, as its inhabitants. What makes this possible and how are these two forms of belonging related? This section will look first at the philosophical basis for being unalienated from nature (an increasingly difficult ideal in the last two centuries), considerations that appeal to the notions of agency, co-dependency, coherence, and a notion of practical reason that takes future generations in its decisional stride; and second at the politics that is suggested by these considerations when they are properly integrated. A central element of this political account will be a critical exposure of just how much capitalist tendencies and mentalities have fallen afoul of the rational demands of these considerations. Here again our chapter will seek to (and expects to) find common ground with the chapter in which issues of the environment are most prominent.

## **20.7 Regional Case Studies: South Asia, Latin America, North America, Middle East.**

These preceding theoretical elaborations and analyses will accommodate most, if not all of the points, that we had been asked to consider in the instructions that were given to our chapter. And once the analytical part of the outline is in place, we will proceed to exploit our team's detailed knowledges and research by producing five regional case studies in which the analytical and theoretical points made so far will be tested and refined in their empirical application. The regions to be studied are: North America (US --racial belonging-- and Canada -- linguistic as well as indigenous belonging), select countries in Latin America (nationalist and indigenous forms of belonging), South Asia (India and Sri Lanka --nationalist, casteist, religious, and linguistic forms of belonging), South East and East Asia (belonging in nature, bioscience, and potential coming together around notions of biosecurity and the public good), the Middle East (religious, primarily Islamic identity and the specifically political forms of belonging it has come to provide in recent decades).



## **CONCLUDING CHAPTERS**

### **Chapter 21. The multiple directions of social progress**

- Acknowledged and ignored urgencies
- Are there credible alternatives to current institutions?
- Emerging alternatives, blocked alternatives
- Is neoliberalism in crisis? What emerges afterward and/or elsewhere?
- Convergence versus multiple paths and models
- Trade-offs and synergies between dimensions of progress
- What are the mechanisms for changing the public discourse
- What can be done in a global world?
- Bottom-up initiatives

## Chapter 22. The contribution of social sciences to policy and institutional change

### **Narrative:**

Chapter 22 will be the final chapter of the report and therefore somewhat different from the preceding chapters. It will draw upon them whenever possible and appropriate, but mainly follow its own structure.

The intention is to give an overview of the contribution the social sciences have had in some major policy areas. We have identified five large areas, broadly defined and necessarily incomplete in capturing the impact which the social sciences undoubtedly have had in other areas. Nevertheless, they seem to us to represent the most salient interfaces in the encounter between policy needs and demands and the knowledge contribution that social sciences have to offer.

The chapter will consist of two parts. The first part is largely descriptive, highlighting both the most visible and/or important contributions the social sciences have made, while taking into account the positioning of the social sciences with regard to those actors and institutions who were influenced by social scientific knowledge. We also invite reference to situations and contexts where such knowledge was available, but explicitly rejected.

Obviously, the networks and interactions between the social sciences and policy-making institutions and actors will differ across time and space; policy areas and countries. Hopefully, providing such additional and essential reflection on the contextual background will also help to map out the space of possibilities for future action and reflection to be taken up in the second part of the chapter.

This will be the normative part. Once we have charted past contributions, the difficulties and obstacles that were encountered or, on the contrary, where the social sciences have been welcome or were successful in opening policy doors, we want to turn to the role the social sciences can and should play in the future in influencing policy-making and, more generally, in democratic societies and democratic decision-making.

This should be more than a summary of lessons learned, important as such retrospective assessments are. Instead, we would like to open up the space to further 'the capacity to aspire' (A.Appadurai): what kind of social science knowledge will be needed for what kind of societies in the future(s)? How can it be empowered across the various and numerous political, economic and institutional hurdles to reach those whose lives and well-being will be affected by the changes lying ahead? Do we have a common vision of what these major transformations will be? Can, the social sciences prepare for them and if so, how?

These are only some of the questions to be dealt with in the second part, but it is important to see the past and present not as being sharply delineated from what lies ahead – the probable and the preferred futures and the contributions the social sciences can bring to help them shape.

### **Structure of the chapter:**

#### **Part I: What role has social science played in policy formation? An accounting**

- A. Economics
- B. Education
- C. Environment, Health and Safety
- D. Development
- E. Science, Technology and Innovation

#### **Part II: What is the appropriate role of social science in shaping policy? The normative question**

- A. Philosophical views.
- B. Institutional Structure and the appropriate role of the social sciences.

### **Conclusion.**